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ANTITRUST OVERREACH: UNDOING 




Information technology markets in general, and wireless 
communications markets in particular, rely on standardization 
mechanisms to develop interoperable devices for data processing, 
storage and transmission. From 2G through the emergent 5G 
standard, wireless communications markets have largely achieved 
standardization through cooperative multi-firm arrangements that 
likely outperform the historically dominant alternatives of government 
monopoly, which is subject to informational deficits and regulatory 
capture, and private monopoly, which suffers from pricing and other 
distortions inherent to protected market positions. This cooperative 
process has successfully relied on three key legal elements: reasonably 
secure patents, quasi-contractual licensing commitments supplemented 
by reputation effects, and targeted application of antitrust safeguards 
against collusion risk. Over approximately the past decade, antitrust 
agencies and courts in the U.S., Europe and Asia have taken actions 
that threaten this legal infrastructure by limiting patentees’ ability to 
seek injunctive relief, adopting rigid understandings of “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing principles, and 
addressing collusion risk among licensors-innovators while 
overlooking (and even exacerbating) collusion risk among licensees-
implementers. These judicial and regulatory interventions in IP 
licensing markets shift value from firms and economies that specialize 
in generating innovations to firms and economies that specialize in 
integrating innovations into end-user products. These entity-level and 
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country-level redistributive effects are illustrated by lobbying activities 
in the wireless communications markets and antitrust actions against 
IP licensors in jurisdictions that have substantial net IP deficits and 
are principally populated by IP licensees. Current antitrust policy 
promotes producers’ narrow interests in lower input costs while 
ignoring the broader public interest in preserving the cooperative 
standardization structures that have supported innovation and 
commercialization in the digital economy.
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Introduction
Modern information and communications technology (“ICT”) markets 
depend on standardization and interoperability to achieve the scale econo-
mies, communication efficiencies and network effects that have generated 
radical reductions in user-to-user, business-to-business, and business-to-user 
transactions. The low-cost, high-quality transmission of data among indi-
viduals and entities using Apple iPhones, Samsung Galaxy smartphones, 
Dell laptops, and Amazon tablets relies on the institutional “plumbing” sup-
plied by the organizational and contractual arrangements that drive market 
standardization. The growth of standard-dependent technology markets is 
remarkable. On a worldwide basis, unit shipments in the smartphone indus-
try grew from 123.9 million in 2007 to 1.47 billion in 2017 while the total 
value of shipments grew from $52 billion in 2007 to $452 billion in 2015.1
These figures will undoubtedly expand as the 5G network and associated 
“Internet of Things” are deployed by device makers and telecommunica-
tions carriers in household, business and industrial environments. The 
emerging 5G environment follows the successful implementation of the 
2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE standards over a period of almost three 
decades starting with the commercial launch of a 2G/GSM network in 
1991.2 The 5G network will comprise data exchange not only between indi-
viduals but also between devices3, thereby bolstering the necessity to main-
1. Jason Dedrick & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Intangible Assets and Value Capture in 
Global Value Chains: The Smartphone Industry 3-4 (World Intellectual Prop. Org., Working 
Paper No. 41, 2017).
2. Each “generation” (or “G”) in wireless communications reflects an increase in the 
efficiency with which data can be transmitted, enabling the evolution of wireless markets from 
mostly voice transmission to the transmission of all types of voice and non-voice data. See
Rafael Saraiva Campos, Evolution of Positioning Techniques in Cellular Networks, from 2G 
to 4G, WIRELESS COMMS. AND MOBILE COMPUTING 2017, at 1, 2.  On the historical timeline 
of wireless communications standards, see Mudit Ratana Bhalla & Anand Vardhan Bhalla, 
Generations of Mobile Wireless Technologies: A Survey, 5 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 
26 (2010).
3. On the core technological elements and practical applications of 5G networks, see 
Nicolo Zingales, Of Coffee Pods, Videogames and Missed Interoperability: Reflections for EU 
Governance of the Internet of Things (Tilburg Law and E. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2015-026, 
2015); Firooz B. Saghezchi et al., Drivers for 5G: The ‘Pervasive Connected’ World, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOBILE NETWORKS, 6-11 (Jonathan Rodriguez ed., Wiley 2015); Peter 
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tain standardized pathways for information transmission. This transforma-
tional shift presents not only a technological challenge but also an organiza-
tional challenge that demands an appropriate institutional environment to 
support the necessary R&D and commercialization investments by technol-
ogy innovators and implementers.
Nothing less than the institutional structure of the information technol-
ogy markets has been targeted by antitrust agencies in the United States, and 
other commercially significant jurisdictions, over the past decade. This reg-
ulatory campaign has culminated in the landmark antitrust litigation brought 
by the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) against Qualcomm, a semi-
conductor firm that is widely recognized as the leading innovator in the 
smartphone industry.4 On May 21, 2019, the district court in the FTC suit 
issued an expansive order (which Qualcomm plans to appeal as of this writ-
ing5) requiring that Qualcomm re-negotiate hundreds of “standard-essential”
patent (“SEP”) licenses with device manufacturers and offer new SEP li-
censes to any interested chip manufacturers.6 If upheld on appeal, this order 
would substantially rewrite the “rules of the game” in patent licensing for 
the smartphone market.  Prior to and concurrently with the FTC suit, com-
petition regulators (excepting a policy shift in November 2017 at the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”)’s Antitrust Division7) in the U.S., China, the 
European Union, South Korea, and Taiwan have similarly sought to limit 
firms’ ability to enforce patents and patent licenses in the smartphone mar-
ket.8 Both regulators and a concurrent scholarly literature have repeatedly 
asserted that patents and patent licenses impose a “tax” that threatens the 
standard-setting initiatives that have accompanied the 2G, 3G, and 4G net-
works.9
Rost et al., Mobile Network Architecture Evolution Toward 5G, IEEE COMMS. MAG., May 
2016, 84.
4. On Qualcomm’s pioneering innovation in the wireless communications market, see
DAVE MOCK, THE QUALCOMM EQUATION: HOW A FLEDGLING TELECOM COMPANY FORGED 
A NEW PATH TO BIG PROFITS AND MARKET DOMINANCE 47-79, 175-85 (2005); Sanford 
Lakoff, Upstart Startup: “Constructed Advantage” and the Example of Qualcomm, 28
TECHNOVATION 831 (2008).
5. See Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm asks U.S. judge to put anti-trust ruling on hold 
while chipmaker appeals, REUTERS (May 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
qualcomm-antitrust/qualcomm-asks-u-s-judge-to-put-anti-trust-ruling-on-hold-while-
chipmaker-appeals-idUSKCN1SZ04R.
6. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 227-29, F.T.C. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 
17-CV-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
7. On the policy shift at the DOJ, dating from November 2017, see infra note 221 and 
accompanying text.
8. See infra note 261, Table 5 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Qualcomm With Monopolizing Key 
Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones (January 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-
device-used (claiming that royalties assessed by Qualcomm “amount to a tax on the manufac-
turers’ use of baseband processors manufactured by Qualcomm’s competitors”).
Spring 2019] Antitrust Overreach 167
In this Article, I show that this argument has things exactly backward: 
patents and patent licenses support the standardization mechanisms that 
have driven the exceptional success of the smartphone markets. It is regula-
tors’ top-down interventions, rather than the bottom-up network of voluntar-
ily negotiated licensing agreements, that threaten to unravel this remarkable 
market-driven mechanism for incentivizing innovation, standardization, and 
dissemination of new technologies across a wide array of products and ser-
vices for end-users.
The regulatory and academic near-consensus10 relies on a false factual 
premise that leads to misguided policy. The factual premise is mistaken be-
cause there is simply no compelling empirical evidence to support regula-
tors’ claims that even the largest patent owners widely engage in “patent 
holdup” or “royalty stacking,” or even have rational incentives to do so.11
Consistent with the exceptional growth of the smartphone industry, all em-
pirical studies have reached relatively modest estimates of the total royalty 
burden typically borne by device manufacturers.12 The policy conclusion is 
mistaken because it ignores the basic fact that a secure legal foundation of 
property rights and contract is a necessary predicate to induce innovators to 
undertake high-cost, high-risk R&D and then disclose the results in a stand-
ard-setting process over which no individual firm exerts unilateral control. 
If that legal predicate is no longer satisfied, firms that currently specialize in 
innovation are likely to reduce R&D activities, withdraw from standard-
setting activities, or construct closed innovation environments in which 
firms monetize R&D through proprietary hardware and software products. 
All those outcomes are almost certainly inferior relative to the status quo.
Following the conventional view, scholars and regulators have widely 
predicted that the combination of abundant intellectual property (“IP”)
rights, multiple IP holders, and multi-component systems that characterizes 
wireless device markets is liable to yield a “tragedy of the anti-commons”13
in which high IP density inflates prices, reduces access and impedes innova-
tion.14 Those types of statements can be found in scholarly publications, in-
10. To be sure, there are exceptions. For contributions that discuss the enabling role of 
patents in technology standardization, see for example, Kristen Jakobson Osenga, Ignorance 
over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Techno-
logical Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 159, 159-60 (2018); David J. Kappos, Innova-
tion-Based Technology Standards Are Under Threat, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/innovation-based-technology-standards-are-under-threat/.
11. For discussion, see infra notes 149-156 and accompanying text.
12. See id.
13. For the original application of this concept in the IP context, with respect to bio-
medical research, see Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools 
and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120-21 (Adam B. Jaffe 
et al. eds., 2001) (describing concerns that a “patent thicket” can slow down innovation). For 
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fluential reports issued by the DOJ, the FTC and the Patent & Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) from 2003 through 201315, and statements made by compe-
tition agencies in the European Union and Asian jurisdictions.16 Some
scholars are already making similar claims before the Internet of Things has 
even been deployed, arguing that intensive patent usage in that market “is 
likely to cause significant social welfare loss in the years ahead.”17
This near-consensus among much of the scholarly and policymaking 
communities faces one minor difficulty: it does not describe any actual real-
world market. As the wireless communications industry has moved from 2G 
to 3G to 4G standards, patent issuance and the dispersion of patent owner-
ship has increased.18 The consensus view would expect to observe some 
combination of increased prices, reduced output, blocked entry, and delayed 
innovation. Yet markets have disobeyed that theory. Quality-adjusted prices 
on mobile telephone devices and computing equipment have fallen, 
smartphone devices have rapidly achieved high rates of adoption in con-
sumer markets, entry rates in device production have remained robust, and 
computing and communications functionalities have continuously im-
proved.19
detailed critical reviews of these arguments, see J. Gregory Sidak, Is Patent Holdup a Hoax?, 
3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 401, 435-45 (2018) [hereinafter Sidak, Hoax]; Jonathan M. Bar-
nett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERK. TECH. L. J. 1313, 1338-56 (2017) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Has the Academy].
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., POLICY STATEMENT 
ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS 4, 6 n.13 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ/USPTO REPORT 2013]; FTC, THE 
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
COMPETITION 28, 191, 234-35 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT 2011]; FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 8, 35, 42, 57, 95 (2007) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ REPORT 
2007]; FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Executive Summary at 6, 7, 15, ch.1 at 33, ch. 2 at 3, ch. 3 at 30, 
37-38, ch. 4 at 5 (2003).
16. For discussion of this global trend, see Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., The Troubling 
Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2, 2 (2015). For 
an example, see Commission Decision of Apr. 29, 2014, Case AT.39939 – Samsung – En-
forcement of UMTS Standard Essential Patents 11 (EC).
17. See Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to 
Aligning Reward to Contribution?, in 16 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 124 
(2016) (“For example, the ‘Internet of Things’ is a new and growing area where royalty stack-
ing and patent holdup appear to be very real dangers.”).
18. See JORGE PADILLA ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 19
tbl. 7 (COMPASS LEXECON 2017). On the increase in patent issuance relating to the 
smartphone market, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REPORT 2017: INTANGIBLE CAPITAL IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 106, 110 (2017)
[hereinafter WORLD IP REPORT].
19. See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. For detailed discussion of this evi-
dence, see Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1338-61.
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The now-standard view has a clear normative implication: namely, 
weaken IP rights and intervene in privately negotiated licensing arrange-
ments to “protect” the public interest against opportunistic enforcement and 
royalty rate-setting by patent owners. Illustrated most vividly by the sweep-
ing order issued in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation20, courts and regulators 
in the U.S. and other commercially significant jurisdictions (again, with the 
recent exception of the DOJ Antitrust Division21) have adopted policies that 
threaten the security of SEPs and the associated licensing infrastructure that 
stands behind the smartphone and related ICT markets. Specifically, courts 
and regulators have largely withdrawn the possibility of injunctive relief for 
SEP owners while regulators have advocated approaches for determining 
“reasonable royalties” in SEP infringement litigation and SEP licenses that 
would effectively reallocate market surplus away from innovators and to-
ward device producers. This regulatory and judicial “reset” of the property 
rules in ICT markets distorts market negotiations between innovator-firms 
that supply the smartphone market with R&D inputs and producer-firms that 
embed those inputs into devices for the end-user. If there is no credible 
threat of injunctive relief, a downstream firm that can fund an extended liti-
gation process (an assumption easily satisfied by the largest branded handset 
manufacturers) will elect what some industry observers now call “efficient”
infringement22: that is, use the upstream firm’s technology and then negoti-
ate the royalty rate in the courthouse, rather than the marketplace.
The sequence of policy actions pursued by competition regulators in the 
U.S. and other jurisdictions has overlooked the patent-dependent organiza-
tional mechanisms that have supported both robust R&D investment and 
standardization initiatives in wireless communications markets. For several 
decades, those markets have achieved those two objectives through a bot-
tom-up process of private ordering rooted in three legal anchors: (i) reason-
ably secure IP rights, (ii) quasi-contractual commitments informed by repu-
tational norms, and (iii) surgically applied antitrust safeguards against 
collusion. A secure foundation of IP rights and contract enforcement is nec-
essary to induce an innovator-firm to invest in R&D and contribute the re-
sulting output toward a collective standard-setting initiative. A rational 
manager will only allocate resources to these high-cost, high-risk activities 
on the expectation that the firm can expect ultimately to earn returns 
through licensing relationships with producer-firms that have the capital and 
expertise to embody R&D in products for the end-user market. From a 
competition policy perspective, this vertically disaggregated structure, over 
20. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
21. On the policy shift at the DOJ, dating from November 2017, see infra note 211 and 
accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Michael T. Renaud et al., Efficient Infringement and the Undervaluation 
of Standard-Essential Patents, 79 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 59 (2016).
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which no individual firm can exercise control, compares favorably with 
more historically prevalent mechanisms for achieving standardization 
through the coercive power of a government monopoly regulator or the 
market power wielded by a single dominant firm.
The approximately three-decade history of wireless communications 
networks has shown how standardization can be achieved without govern-
ment direction, thereby harnessing the superior information-gathering and 
processing capacities of the private market, but without entrenching a single 
dominant incumbent, thereby avoiding the pricing, output, and other distor-
tions inherent to a monopolized market. When this occurs, there is no quasi-
utility entity setting the standard, and government intervention counterpro-
ductively substitutes an ad hoc rate-setting process, as implemented through 
legal proceedings, for the collective judgment of market actors, as expressed 
through the price discovery mechanism. As scholars working in the public 
choice tradition have emphasized and documented, resource allocation 
through the political process presumptively underperforms resource alloca-
tion through the market due to inherent informational disadvantages, bu-
reaucratic delay and the susceptibility of political entities to capture by well-
organized rent-seeking constituencies.23 In the wireless communications 
markets, a consistent pattern of political-economic behavior supplies sub-
stantial ground for the latter concern, at both the “firm level” and the “coun-
try level.” Since the inception of these markets, firms and countries that 
specialize in the production, assembly and distribution segments of the ICT 
supply chain have advocated for, and achieved substantial success in secur-
ing, outcomes in antitrust and patent law that attenuate patent owners’ abil-
ity to bring enforcement actions against, and negotiate licensing fees with, 
intermediate users. From a privately interested perspective, the logic is self-
evident. Weakening patents shifts the “IP balance of trade” in favor of firms 
and countries that principally occupy downstream portions of the ICT sup-
ply chain while potentially undercompensating firms that specialize in up-
stream R&D. From a publicly interested perspective, however, regulatory 
and judicial interventions that erode the property rights and contracting in-
frastructure behind wireless technology markets endangers the cooperative 
standardization mechanisms that have supported innovation and commer-
cialization in these markets.
This Article comprises five parts. In Part I, I review the efficiency gains 
that are attributable to standardization and the principal mechanisms by 
which ICT markets have achieved standardization. In Part II, I compare the 
net welfare effects of each principal standardization mechanism. In Part III, 
23. For classic statements of this view, see ROBERT E. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D.
TOLLISON, POLITICIZED ECONOMIES: MONARCHY, MONOPOLY AND MERCANTILISM 27-46
(1997); ROBERT E. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MERCANTILISM AS A RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY: ECONOMIC REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-25 (1981).
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I show that secure IP rights and contract enforcement are a critical predicate 
for enabling cooperative standardization without recourse to a monopolist 
entity, whether a government regulator or a dominant incumbent. In Part IV, 
I explore how regulators and courts’ recent interventions in wireless markets 
endanger cooperative standardization by eroding the security of patents and 
associated licensing agreements. In Part V, I show how these policy choices 
advantage firms and economies that specialize in implementation over firms 
and economies that specialize in innovation, posing risks to a successful in-
novation ecosystem. Then, I briefly conclude.
I.  Standardization in Technology Markets: 
Foundational Observations
This Part addresses two foundational elements in the policy analysis of 
standardization processes. First, I review the economic benefits that can be 
reasonably attributed to successful standardization initiatives in technology 
markets. Second, I review the fundamental types of mechanisms by which 
governments and markets have sought to achieve standardization.
A. The Social Value of Standardization
It is widely recognized that standardization is a precondition for achiev-
ing the interoperability that characterizes contemporary ICT markets.24 Con-
sumers are accustomed to expect that an HP printer can communicate with a 
Dell PC, or a Samsung handset can communicate with an Apple iPhone, 
which can in turn communicate with an LG television. But this market 
structure is not self-evident. Until the launch of the IBM PC in 1981, a user 
who sought to put together a computing package was generally compelled 
to purchase all components from a single provider.25 As the digital economy 
now proceeds toward engineering a complex network of information path-
ways between home, office, and industrial devices that extend beyond tradi-
tionally defined ICT markets, the importance of interoperability will only 
increase. The web of data-gathering, processing and transmission relation-
ships that will characterize the 5G ecosystem will depend on standardized 
protocols by which individual and entity-level users can gather, exchange 
and analyze data with speed, reliability, and security.26 This standardization 
24. For general treatments of the economics of standardization, with a focus on ICT 
markets, see KNUT BLIND, THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, POLICY 
(2004); PETER GRINDLEY, STANDARDS, STRATEGY AND POLICY: CASES AND STORIES 1-54
(1995); Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An 
Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3 (1990).
25. See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 163-64.
26. See Saghezchi et al., supra note 3, at 3 (stating that “[g]lobal standards are a fun-
damental cornerstone in reaching ubiquitous connectivity, ensuring worldwide interoperabil-
ity, enabling multi-vendor harmonization and economies of scale”).
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process has three principal pro-competitive effects: (i) increased network 
effects; (ii) reduced entry costs; and (iii) reduced hold-up risk.
1. Network Effects
Network effects refer to the fact that the consumption value of certain 
goods increases as a function of the number of other users, or the number of 
uses, of those goods.27 This is an inherent characteristic of communication 
devices (for example, a cellphone has greater consumption value as the 
number of other users of cellphones increases) and communication plat-
forms (for example, Facebook), and a common, if not typical, characteristic 
of certain computing devices or components of a larger computing envi-
ronment (for example, the Windows operating system has greater consump-
tion value as the number of Windows-compatible applications increases). 
Standardization amplifies network effects (and hence, the value of the rele-
vant device or platform) by increasing the number of users with whom any 
individual user can communicate—or, more precisely, by minimizing the 
costs incurred by any individual user to communicate with other users.28 A
vivid illustration is provided by the adoption of the GSM standard in the Eu-
ropean wireless telecommunications markets starting in the early 1990s.  
This development created a transnational market for digital transmission of 
voice communications among hundreds of millions of users, a substantial 
improvement over what had previously been mostly localized national mar-
kets separated by incompatible country-specific standards.29
2. Entry Costs
Standardization and interoperability lower entry costs by relieving firms 
from having to provide an “end-to-end” package of complementary goods 
and services. This was not the case in the computing markets that predated 
the advent of the PC: computing firms typically supplied business customers 
with a complete, or substantially complete, bundle of hardware and software 
solutions.30 Given that these packages were not typically interoperable with 
each other, any new competitor was required to deliver a functionally com-
parable and approximately cost-equivalent package of products and ser-
vices. By contrast, in today’s “plug and play” computing market, an assem-
bler firm such as Dell can offer customers a bundle comprised of software 
27. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW 671 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998).
28. See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 2.
29. See Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization: The 
Case of GSM, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 171, 186 (2002).
30. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW xxii (3d ed. 
2018).
Spring 2019] Antitrust Overreach 173
and hardware components supplied by multiple firms. Given a common 
technological standard, a firm can contemplate entry into a particular ICT 
market by providing only a superior product or service at a single point on 
the supply chain31 or operating as an assembler entity that integrates compo-
nents supplied by firms with different areas of specialization. This reduces, 
potentially dramatically, the costs and expertise required to achieve viable 
entry into a technology market. In the aggregate, the economically attractive 
results include increased entry opportunities, specialization of labor, and 
price and quality competition throughout the supply chain.
3. Hold-Up Risk
Any new technology demands that intermediate and end-users incur 
significant adoption, learning, and other costs. If a user expects to incur 
comparable costs in switching to any alternative technology, then it antici-
pates that a technology provider may have incentives to adversely change 
the terms of access once the user has made the necessary investment to 
adopt the provider’s technology. This scenario is an application of the 
standard hold-up problem in industrial organization. In its simplest form, the 
hold-up problem arises whenever one party has made a substantial invest-
ment in a business relationship and that investment has no or lesser value in 
any other use. Setting aside reputation effects or contractual protections, the 
non-investing party (or the party that has not made a comparably-sized in-
vestment in the relationship) then has an incentive to unilaterally alter the 
terms of the relationship to its advantage given that the investing party can-
not credibly threaten to exit except at a substantial loss.32 In the technology 
context, this implies that a provider will have an incentive to expropriate 
value from a user in an amount almost equivalent to the switching costs that 
the user would incur in migrating to an alternative technology.
Standardization can attenuate the hold-up problem by reducing users’
switching costs.  To the extent that users do not purchase a complete bundle 
sold by a single firm but rather have the ability to “mix and match” compo-
nents from multiple firms, they have lower switching costs.  As a conse-
quence, the provider of any particular component (or an assembler that mar-
31. For relevant discussion, see PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 24, 32; BLIND, supra 
note 24, at 17. On the movement of the computing industry from vertically integrated firms 
that offered stand-alone computing packages to horizontally specialized firms that offer in-
teroperable components, see Joel West, Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Open Innova-
tion?, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 
2006).
32. For the classic source, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 52-61 (1985). For related and widely-cited treatments, see Oliver E. William-
son, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 233, 234 (1979); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and 
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297-98 (1978).
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kets a package of components) has more limited (although still some) hold-
up opportunities. In the aggregate, this operates to the benefit of both pro-
viders and users in technology markets. If lower switching costs imply that 
providers will have more limited hold-up opportunities, then users will no 
longer demand a discount at the time of adoption to reflect the risk of ra-
tionally opportunistic behavior on the part of the provider. The result is a 
virtuous cycle in which market adoption and size expand, enhancing the 
network effects, entry opportunities and specialization efficiencies discussed 
above.
B. Paradigm Standardization Mechanisms
Technology standardization represents a coordination problem in which 
at least a substantial portion of the relevant market must converge upon a 
common platform on the basis of which firms can develop complementary 
products and services, each of which then interacts with one another with 
minimal transactional friction. Both in theory and as a matter of historical 
experience, there are three types of mechanisms by which economies have 
achieved (or have sought to achieve) this objective: (i) standardization by a 
government regulator; (ii) standardization by a dominant firm; and (iii) 
standardization by cooperative action.33
1. Standardization by Government Monopoly
A government entity can specify a particular standard and, using the co-
ercive power of law, compel market actors to comply with that standard. 
This mechanism is widely used in food and ethical drug markets by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and the Food & Drug Administration, in the au-
tomotive market by the National Transportation Safety Board, and in the 
aviation industry by the Federal Aviation Administration.34 In a variant on 
this option, the government may mandate a generally defined standard and 
then rely on designated private entities to execute the remainder of the 
33. For a similar tripartite distinction between governmental, cooperative and monopo-
list forms of standardization, see Osenga, supra note 10, at 164; PADILLA ET AL., supra note 
18, at 3, 36; Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integration Innovation Con-
cerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 597-98 (1998). 
Much of the literature relies on a more general distinction between de facto and de jure stand-
ardization, in which the former refers to market standardization by a dominant firm or a coali-
tion of firms (sometimes called a consortium) and the latter refers to standardization by a gov-
ernmental body or a recognized standardization entity that operates on a nonprofit basis. See, 
e.g., GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 25; Joel West, The Economic Realities of Open Standards, 
in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 94 (eds. Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter West, Economic realities]; David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 4.
34. For a discussion of these and other government standard-setting agencies, see 
SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE 
NATIONS 117-18 (1997).
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standard-setting and standard-compliance process.35 A well-known example 
in the U.S. context is the role of the leading credit rating firms, Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s, on which the Securities and Exchange Commission 
partially relies in executing certain regulatory objectives.36 In other markets, 
governments have explicitly or implicitly recognized certain national and 
international organizations (for example, the American National Standards 
Institute) as the exclusive standard-setting entity, which in turn sometimes 
delegates standard-setting or accreditation functions to regional and indus-
try-specific entities.37
2. Standardization by Private Monopoly
A firm that has a sufficiently large share of the market can effectively
specify a quasi-mandatory standard—what is sometimes called a de facto 
standard—by virtue of the fact that its technology has been adopted as a 
critical component for related products and services in the relevant market.38
Typically this “monopoly”39 standard is the result of an initial and intense 
competition between different standards at the emergence of the relevant 
market. This scenario is commonly illustrated by the Microsoft Windows 
operating system (“OS”), which (including its antecedent, MS-DOS) has 
operated as a near-universal technological component in the PC market 
since prevailing in an initial “standards war” among competing operating 
systems in the early 1980s.40 The Windows platform has provided a com-
mon language for developers to write applications for that platform (some-
35. For a discussion of this structure and related public-private standard-setting mecha-
nisms, see Panagiotis Delimatsis, Introduction: Continuity and Change in International 
Standardization, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDISATION 4-6 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
36. The Dodd-Frank Act placed substantial limitations on this practice. See Frank 
Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407, 1419-27 (2017).
37. See Carl Cargill & Sherrie Bolin, Standardization: A Failing Paradigm, in
STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 302 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango 2007).
38. See SUSANNE K. SCHMIDT & RAYMUND WERLE, COORDINATING TECHNOLOGY:
STUDIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 86 (1998).
39. Unless otherwise specified, throughout I use the term “monopoly” or “dominant 
firm” interchangeably to refer to a firm that holds a substantial market share and is protected 
to some extent from immediate entry, resulting in some appreciable degree of pricing power.
40. Mikko Valimaki and Ville Oksanen, The impact of free and open source licensing 
on operating system software markets, 22 Telematics and Informatics 97, 98 (2005); Martin 
Campbell-Kelly, Not Only Microsoft: The Maturing of the Personal Computer Software In-
dustry, 1982-1995, 75 Bus. Hist. Rev. 103, 112-14 (2001). As of 1992, Microsoft’s share of 
the PC operating system market was estimated to be approximately 90%.  See Richard J. Gil-
bert, Networks, Standards and the Use of Market Dominance: Microsoft, in THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 410-11 (eds. John E. Kwoka, Jr. and 
Lawrence J. White, 3rd ed. 1999). As of April 2019, its market share was estimated at 79%. 
See Desktop Operating System Market Share Worldwide Apr 2018 – Apr 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide/2018 (last visit-
ed May 21, 2019).
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thing that Microsoft promoted by providing developers with access to the 
Windows OS’s application programming interfaces41), which has in turn 
promoted adoption by a large population of end-users. The dominance of 
the MS Windows standard is suggested by its longevity and the failure of 
the desktop computing market to migrate to the zero-price alternative of-
fered by the Linux OS.42 Even this powerful standard has ultimately been 
exposed to some competitive discipline, as demonstrated by Windows’ fail-
ure to penetrate the handset and mobile device markets that are dominated 
by the Apple iOS and Linux-based Android operating systems,43 which 
mimic some of the functionalities provided by a PC.
3. Standardization by Cooperative Action
A group of firms or other entities can agree collectively upon the speci-
fication of a common standard for a particular technology market. This can 
be accomplished through arrangements that operate at different levels of 
formalization and openness, ranging from accredited standard-development 
organizations that operate at high levels of openness and transparency, to 
unaccredited but still highly formalized standard-setting organizations 
(“SSOs”) that are generally open to all interested parties, and ad hoc indus-
try consortia consisting of a relatively small number of industry leaders for 
purposes of promoting adoption of a particular technology.44 Analogous to 
the case of standardization by a monopolist, this scenario is often character-
ized by an initial stage in which multiple standards groups compete with one 
another, which typically results in a single or predominant standard. A fa-
miliar example is the standards war in the high-definition video player mar-
ket, in which the HD DVD standard (supported by a consortium led by 
Toshiba) lost out to the Blu-Ray standard (supported by a consortium led by 
Sony).45 More recent examples in the wireless markets include the rivalry 
between GSM and CDMA-based systems in the U.S., European and Japa-
nese markets (with mostly the latter standard having prevailed in the 3G 
41. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform 
Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1872-73 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Host’s Dilemma].
42. While the Linux OS has achieved substantial adoption in the server market and, as 
modified in the Android OS, the mobile device market, this is not the case in the desktop PC 
market. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commoditization, Bundling and Concen-
tration, J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 4-5 Fig. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Barnett, Costs of Free].
43. See id.
44. On the distinctions between these types of cooperative standard-setting entities, see 
Cargill & Bolin, supra note 34, at 302-04, 323-26. In this paper, I use the term, “SSO”, broad-
ly to cover any type of non-governmental standardization entity.
45. See Scott R. Gallagher, The Battle of the Blue Laser DVDs: The Significance of 
Corporate Strategy in Standards Battles, 32 TECHNOVATION 90 (2012).
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standardization process46), as well as the rivalry in the 4G market between 
the WiMAX standard advocated by a group led by Intel and the LTE (Long 
Term Evolution) standard advocated by a group of firms led by Qualcomm 
(with the latter having prevailed in the 4G standardization process).47 While 
some firms have held substantial IP positions in these standards, no single 
firm has enjoyed independent control over the standard as in the case of Mi-
crosoft Windows or a government agency in the case of state-mandated 
standards. In the emergent 5G network, patent positions are even more 
widely dispersed48 and multiple consortia and similar groups have arisen to 
establish standards for information transmission at different levels of the 
network.49
II. Comparative Welfare Effects of 
Standardization Mechanisms
There is little doubt that standardization yields substantial social gains 
in the form of increased network effects, reduced entry costs, and accelerat-
ed adoption by intermediate and end-users. This uncontroversial view is il-
lustrated by the explosive growth of the PC and smartphone markets,50 both 
of which relied on the establishment of widely adopted market standards: in 
the former case, Microsoft’s Windows OS, and in the latter, the GSM and 
CDMA technologies in the 2G, 3G and 4G cellular communications mar-
kets. As those markets illustrate, standardization can be achieved through 
various mechanisms (a single dominant firm in the case of Windows; coop-
erative multi-firm arrangements in the case of the wireless communications 
markets). Each mechanism inherently gives rise to certain social costs that 
must be incurred to achieve the gains associated with standardization. 
Hence, it is necessary to weigh the anticipated social costs and gains rea-
sonably attributable to each mechanism in order to arrive at even an imper-
fect comparative net welfare assessment of these alternative routes toward 
standardization.51 In this Part, I discuss the likely net welfare effects of each 
46. See Pat Norton, Newcomers and Innovation in the U.S. Telephone Industry – Then 
and Now, in THE EMERGENCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
234-35 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 2002).
47. See PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 10, 42.
48. See infra Table 2; PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 19 tbl. 7.
49. Some of these organizations include 3GPP, the Open Interconnect Consortium (led 
by Intel), the AllSeen Alliance (led by Qualcomm), the Industrial Internet Consortium, the 
Thread Group, IEEE P2413 and Open M2M. See Zingales, supra note 3, at 30-31.
50. See Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1.
51. My discussion builds on prior contributions that have discussed the welfare effects 
of different mechanisms for achieving standardization. See PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 
25-44, who compare standard development organizations to standard-setting by government 
entities and standard-setting by a monopolist. For a comparison of the economic effects of 
standard-setting through cooperative entities such as SSOs and a market-based “standards 
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of the three paradigm standardization structures (and referenced in the Table 
below), taking into account the existing body of theoretical and empirical 
analysis relating to the economics and (what is sometimes overlooked) his-
tory of standardization processes in technology markets. To structure this 
analysis, I discuss specifically the expected performance of these standardi-
zation structures at two critical stages in the standard-setting timeline: (i) 
standard selection; and (ii) standard implementation.
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war” see Joanne Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L. J. 157 (2014).  See 
Shane Greenstein & Marc Rysman, Coordination Costs and Standard Setting, in STANDARDS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007), who compare, through a 
case study of the “56K modem” standard, the comparative advantages of standard-setting 
through an SSO as compared to market competition and regulatory intervention. An older 
theoretical contribution analyzed the relative efficiency of achieving standardization through 
markets, committees (roughly analogous to SSOs in real-world markets), and hybrid mecha-
nisms. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 
19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988).
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A. Government Standardization
Historically, standardization by government action has often been 
viewed as the “default” mechanism by which economies achieve the two 
critical steps of standard selection and standard implementation (or more 
precisely, standard adoption, which is then followed by implementation by 
private entities).52 This assumption is reflected in the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides that “Congress shall have Power To . . . fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures.”53 This view reflects the intuition that markets left 
to their own devices would be unable to agree upon a common standard, ei-
ther because no firm would have an incentive to independently invest in 
standardization (a costly activity that confers uncompensated benefits on 
others) or each firm would seek to maximize profits by securing adoption of 
its proprietary technology as the market standard.54 A government-based 
mechanism for achieving standardization has the advantage that, subject to 
rule-promulgation and enforcement costs, it can use the coercive force of 
law to induce compliance with a standard. As a practical matter, govern-
ment standardization mechanisms have operated either directly through reg-
ulatory entities or, as has been more common historically in the U.S., indi-
rectly through quasi-governmental nonprofit entities that were subsequently 
recognized as the authoritative standardization authority in a particular in-
dustry.55 As noted in the Table above, government standardization remains 
prevalent in markets involving public safety issues such as food, ethical 
drugs, and transportation.
While government standardization exhibits enforcement efficiencies 
arising from a state’s coercive powers, it suffers from certain inefficiencies 
that are inherent to any monopolized form of standard-setting that is not ex-
posed to competitive discipline. First, a government standardization monop-
oly may select the “wrong” standard—meaning, a standard that reduces 
transaction costs less efficiently as compared to other technologically feasi-
ble standards—or fail to appropriately update an existing standard. If the 
government acts as the exclusive entity for setting and updating a particular 
standard, the risk of inefficient standard selection and maintenance is exac-
erbated by the fact that there is no process by which prospective standard-
setting entities must compete to induce users to invest resources in adopting 
52. See KRISLOV, supra note 34, at 54 (stating that “government regulations represent a 
rich source—historically, the richest source—of standards); id. at 132 (noting that European 
standard-setting has taken place principally through national standard organizations, which are 
usually governmental).
53. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
54. See David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 33.
55. See Pierre Larouche & Geertrui van Overwalle, Interoperability Standards, Patents 
and Competition Policy, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDISATION 367, 369-70 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). On the history of standard-
ization in the U.S. in particular, see Cargill & Bolin, supra note 34, at 299-300.
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(and retaining) a particular standard.56 Second, a government standardiza-
tion monopoly gives rise to the social losses associated with rent-seeking 
efforts by private entities to capture regulators and influence standardization 
choices to advance private interests. As a result, a government standard-
setting entity may pursue collateral policy objectives (such as favoring do-
mestic or otherwise politically favored firms) that are not aligned with mar-
ket efficiency.57 Consistent with this logic, the Supreme Court’s 2015 deci-
sion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC58
emphasized the inherent risk of anticompetitive conduct in the case of gov-
ernmentally authorized standard-setting monopolies that are administered 
by industry representatives. While similarly opportunistic behavior could 
arise in private standard-setting entities that may be governed or heavily in-
fluenced by affected constituencies (as discussed below59), the coercive ca-
pacities of a government entity, together with the displacement of a compet-
itive market for standard-setting services, may increase the incidence or 
severity of such behavior.
As noted above60, government standardization is sometimes achieved 
through a hybrid model in which a government agency identifies a standard-
ization objective in general terms and then designates a private entity to ex-
ecute the standardization process by developing more granular standards 
and associated verification methodologies. Delegating these functions to en-
tities that operate on a day-to-day basis in the relevant industry may im-
prove the quality of the information that is reflected in the standard. How-
ever, there remains some appreciable risk of inefficient standard-setting and 
maintenance insofar as the challenge of securing the government’s blessing 
acts as an implicit entry barrier against other entities that are not yet desig-
nated as officially recognized market gatekeepers, thereby muting the oth-
erwise favorable effects of a competitive standard-setting environment. As 
noted above,61 a well-known example is the handful of credit-rating agen-
cies relied upon by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection 
with the registration of public debt securities. The performance record of 
these entities is contested. In the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, com-
56. For similar thoughts, see PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 40. For a general over-
view of informational deficiencies in government standard-setting, see David & Greenstein, 
supra note 24, at 29-31.  The assumption that a government standardization entity is not sub-
ject to competitive discipline may be attenuated in a global economy to the extent that poten-
tially adopting firms can “shop around” among government and private standardization pro-
viders.  For evidence that this occurred in the Chinese market, see infra note 284 and 
accompanying text.  However, note that governments can always elect to compel firms under 
their jurisdiction to adopt the government-designated standard.
57. See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 62-63; David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 32.
58. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015).
59. See infra Part II.C.2.
60. See supra note 55.
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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mentators widely criticized the rating agencies’ apparent failure to appropri-
ately assess the risk of certain financial instruments, which is sometimes at-
tributed to the implicit entry barrier created by the difficulty of securing des-
ignation as a “nationally recognized statistical ratings organization” for 
securities regulatory purposes.62
B. Monopoly Standardization
Standards are sometimes set by firms with dominant market positions, 
rather than through government entities (or government-designated private 
entities) that enjoy a standardization monopoly as a matter of law. During 
the postwar period and through the 1970s, IBM effectively set the dominant 
architecture for the mainframe and certain other computing markets through 
its System/370 family of computers.63 IBM’s influence reflected its over-
whelming market share (ranging from 84% of the mainframe market in 
1956 to 71% in 1986).64 Starting in the 1980s, Microsoft has set, and main-
tains, the de facto OS standard for the PC market, a position that Windows 
OS secured after prevailing against competing systems.65 As compared to a 
government standardization monopolist, a private standardization monopo-
list appears to compare favorably insofar as the initial standards war implies 
a higher likelihood that the market may have converged upon the maximally 
efficient standard, at least at the outset. In place of an administrative process 
that is inherently subject to informational asymmetries, regulatory capture, 
and bureaucratic delay66, the monopolist must prevail (at least initially) in 
competition against other standard-setters to secure adoption by intermedi-
ate and end-users. So long as that process is open to entry, there should be a 
high level of confidence that the standards war has converged, at least ini-
tially, upon the most efficient technologically feasible option.
A substantial literature contests this proposition, taking the view that 
standards wars may either end prematurely, selecting an inferior technologi-
cal alternative, or exhibit inertia by not migrating to a superior new alterna-
62. See Partnoy, supra note 36.
63. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Franco Malerba, Industrial Dynamics and the Evolu-
tion of Firms’ and Nations’ Competitive Capabilities in the World Computer Industry, in
SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: STUDIES OF SEVEN INDUSTRIES 79, 96-97 (David C. 
Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 1999).
64. Micro Mart Growth Seen Threat to IBM, 15 COMPUTERWORLD 65 (1981).
65. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
66. An historical episode from the AM radio market illustrates the extent to which bu-
reaucratic inertia can slow down standard selection. The FCC deliberated from 1961 to 1982 
over competing standards for the then-novel AM stereo radio market. Once the FCC allowed 
stations to choose any standard (subject to the station’s allocated bandwidth), the market con-
verged on a dominant standard within three years and the AM stereo market was launched. 
See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 73.
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tive.67 This “lock-in” argument, which has mostly been presented in theoret-
ical terms with some anecdotal support, relies on the fact that standards de-
rive value from network effects, which are in turn supported by adoption 
among certain user populations. Those effects can cause markets to “tip”
toward a single standard (in some theoretical models, due to random histori-
cal events68), which then makes it difficult for entrants to induce any indi-
vidual user to incur the costs of switching to a competing platform that has 
not yet achieved substantial adoption. Just as positive externalities can ini-
tially inhibit standard development, they can also inhibit migration away 
from an entrenched standard. Hence, even assuming Windows was once the 
most efficient computing platform among all feasible technological alterna-
tives, there can be no assurance that this continues to be the case if entrants 
must incur sufficiently high costs in order to persuade existing users to mi-
grate to a more efficient, but not-yet-widely-adopted, platform. As a result, 
even a technologically superior standard may be unable to achieve entry—
precisely the argument made by the federal government in its antitrust liti-
gation against Microsoft in the late 1990s and early 2000s.69
The lock-in argument has been strongly contested on empirical grounds 
by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis. Specifically, Liebowitz and Mar-
golis argue that key historical cases cited in support of the lock-in theory 
(for example, the victory of the allegedly inferior VHS video cassette re-
cording standard over Sony’s Betamax standard) do not persuasively 
demonstrate that the market selected the “wrong” standard.70 Relatedly, oth-
er authors have observed that, while established standards may enjoy domi-
nance as a result of network effects and user switching costs, these obstacles 
are not insurmountable and incumbent standard-setters are therefore subject 
to some competitive discipline.71 Consistent with this view, there are multi-
ple cases in which dominant pioneering standard-setters have rapidly lost 
market share to entrants. Examples include the downfall of MySpace in the 
streaming video market (challenged successfully by YouTube), Netscape 
Navigator in the internet browser market (displaced by Microsoft’s Internet 
67. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY, 75 AMER. ECON. REV. 332, 336 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 64.
69. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting 
district court’s finding that users of operating systems are unlikely to switch to rivals, even in 
response to a substantial increase in price).
70. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon 
Tragedy, 82 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133, 134-35 (1994) (noting that empirical support for 
lock-in effects are weak); id. at 148-49 (noting lack of evidence for popular claim that market 
selected the “wrong” standard in the video recorder market).
71. See Barnett, Costs of Free, supra note 43, at 16-17; Timothy F. Bresnahan & Pai-
Ling Yin, Standard Setting in Markets: The Browser War, in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 29 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007).
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Explorer, which was ultimately displaced by Google’s Chrome), Yahoo! in 
the search engine market (challenged successfully by Google), and Palm Pi-
lot in the mobile device market (challenged successfully by Blackberry, 
which was in turn challenged successfully by Apple’s iPhone and other 
smartphone devices). The fact that even dominant standards are regularly 
subject to competitive threats casts doubt on the view that markets are likely 
to be locked into an inefficient standard for a considerable period of time. 
As some commentators have suggested, the most well-grounded position 
may be that standards markets exhibit “degrees” of lock-in, depending on 
the capital and expertise required to achieve entry, which may delay or dis-
suade entry in certain circumstances.72 So long as any such lock-in effect is 
weaker than a “government lock-in” effect enforced by law, however, it is 
reasonable to maintain the presumption that market-based standard selection 
and maintenance will tend to outperform assigning those functions to a gov-
ernment monopolist.
C. Cooperative Standardization
The final paradigm standardization structure lies approximately at an 
intermediate point on an organizational spectrum bounded, at one end, by 
government standardization, in which market selection of a dominant stand-
ard is displaced by an administrative expert-based process, and, at the other 
end, by market standardization, in which standard setting is the result of 
open-market competition among firms offering alternative coordination so-
lutions. By contrast, what I will call “cooperative” standardization incorpo-
rates elements of both (i) market competition, insofar as the standard-setting 
process is administered by personnel associated with profit-seeking firms 
exposed to competitive discipline in corresponding product and services 
markets, and (ii) bureaucratic decision-making, insofar as the standard is 
specified primarily through cooperative interactions between technical per-
sonnel at those firms.73
1. The Overlooked Virtues of Dispersed Patent Ownership
At the point of standard selection, the same reasons that suggest that 
standardization by a private monopolist will outperform standardization by 
a government monopolist support confidence in the standardization out-
comes reached through cooperative arrangements. As compared to govern-
72. See Shane & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 8-9. For a related view, see Bresnahan & 
Yin, supra note 68, at 29-30, arguing that inertia in standards markets characterized by net-
work effects may represent an “intermediate cost”, which persists but can be overcome by 
sufficiently strong countervailing forces.
73. On the technical character of the standard-setting process, and the dominant role of 
engineers in that process, see SCHMIDT & WERLE, supra note 38, at 61; see Osenga, supra 
note 10, at 179-80.
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ment standardization, there is a higher level of confidence that cooperative 
standardization would result in selection of the maximally efficient standard 
to the extent that the standard-setting entity must compete with other such 
entities and is managed by market participants rather than expert bureau-
crats who are not exposed to competitive discipline and are susceptible to 
regulatory capture.  In the case where the cooperative standard-setting entity 
is not competing with other standard-setting entities, it still faces some mar-
ket discipline to the extent that it must secure adoption by intermediate and 
end-users (as contrasted with a government standard-setting entity that can 
at least partially rely on the force of law to compel adoption).
At the subsequent stage of standard implementation, standardization by 
cooperative action most likely outperforms standardization by a monopolist 
as a general matter. Cooperative standardization necessarily implies that the 
technology inputs required to implement the standard are diffused to some 
extent across multiple firms, rather than being exclusively controlled by a 
single firm, which would then be in a position to independently set and im-
plement the standard. Absent collusion between the owners of patents in-
corporated in the standard, this suggests that the pricing power exercised by 
any individual firm after cooperative selection of the dominant standard is 
weaker as compared to a state of affairs in which a single firm sets, and con-
trols implementation of, the standard through its IP portfolio. In the PC OS 
market, Microsoft sets the standard by virtue of its ownership of the IP 
rights relating to the Windows OS (and the network effects that may partial-
ly shelter the Windows franchise), which in turn confers upon Microsoft the 
exclusive ability to produce, distribute, and modify the Windows OS.74 By 
contrast, multiple firms hold ownership interests in the key technological 
components required to produce and distribute a smartphone device, poten-
tially resulting in more attenuated pricing power as compared to a market in 
which a single firm owns all components of the standard.75 In the 4G/LTE 
74. I recognize that the extent to which Microsoft has been able to, or has elected to, 
exert pricing power with respect to Windows OS is highly debated. For some of those com-
peting views, see MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY: SELECTED ESSAYS
(David S. Evans ed., 2002). My argument simply relies on the assumption that a monopolist 
provider of a technology standard is in general likely to have greater pricing power as com-
pared to a market in which multiple firms hold ownership interests in various components of a 
standard.
75. Others would argue just the opposite. Specifically, it might be argued that a state of 
affairs in which multiple firms hold patents to the critical components of a technology stand-
ard would result in a collectively non-profit-maximizing total royalty burden, given that each 
patent holder will select the individually profit-maximizing rate. A monopolist would rational-
ly eliminate this pricing inefficiency. The empirical strength of this theoretical objection de-
pends closely on the extent to which, as a practical matter, patent holders actually do not take 
into account the pricing behavior of other licensors. As I discuss subsequently, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the most significant patentee-licensors in the smartphone market make 
efforts to signal, and commit to, a total aggregate royalty burden. This behavior is consistent 
with a theoretical model that takes into account repeat-play effects and signaling opportunities 
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standard, 20 firms account for an estimated 85.5% of all SEP families; and 
in the 5G standard-setting process, 20 firms account (so far) for an estimat-
ed 65.2% of all SEP families.76 The Table below shows the percentage own-
ership shares of SEP families relating to the 4G/LTE and 5G standards, il-
lustrating the extent to which those contributions are dispersed among 
multiple holders.








Qualcomm 9.41% 8.6% 
Huawei 9.88% 7.92% 
LG 6.13% 7.38% 
Ericsson 6.58% 6.74% 
Samsung 13.49% 5.77% 
Nokia 8.74% 3.48%78
ZTE 1.4% 4.1%
Intel — 3.04% 
Alcatel-Lucent 1.12% 2.06% 
NTT DOCOMO 4.28% 2.61% 
NEC 1.56% 1.91% 
Sony 1.12% 1.75% 
ETRI 1.2% 1.7% 
Sharp 2.14% 1.69% 
Panasonic 2.08% 1.47% 
in an iterative standardization framework. Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14; see infra 
notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
76. See Tim Pohlmann (IPlytics GmbH), Industry report – Who will be the technology 
leader for 5G? Part two, IAM, July 18, 2018 (explaining ownership of 5G-related patent fam-
ilies) [hereinafter Pohlmann, Part two]; WORLD IP REPORT supra note 16, at 111 fig. 4.9 (il-
lustrating ownership of 4G/LTE-related patent families). Note that a “patent family” refers to 
a group of patents issued in multiple countries but relating to a single invention by a single 
inventor (or group of inventors). There may be differences between the methodologies used to 
calculate ownership of 5G and 4G/LTE-related patent families, although I note that the WIPO 
source relies on the “IPlytics” database that is also the source for the 5G data presented above.
77. See supra note 73. Note that a firm without an entry in a particular column indi-
cates that, with respect to the relevant patent family, the firm did not rank among the “top 20”
patent owners.
78. Does not include patents acquired by Nokia in acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent in 
2016.
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Blackberry 2.05% 1.29% 
Apple 1.74% 1.12% 
InterDigital 4.52% 1.08% 
MediaTek — 0.79% 
Motorola — 0.71% 
Google79 4.79% —
Texas Instruments 1.26% —
Siemens 1.2%
Others80 3.08% —
Total (Top 20 only) 85.53% 65.21%
Scholars and policymakers tend to view the dispersed ownership of IP 
rights as a vice rather than a virtue. Specifically, conventional wisdom tends 
to view dispersed patent ownership as a source of transactional friction in 
the form of “patent thickets” and related transactional obstacles that can 
limit access to technology inputs, raise end-user prices, and generally im-
pede the innovation and commercialization process.81 At least in the ICT 
context, this broad-brush assumption overlooks the critical role played by 
patents in reducing the expropriation risk that might otherwise frustrate val-
ue-enhancing exchanges of intellectual assets among potentially adverse 
third parties. Specifically, patent rights support the vertically specialized 
structure of the wireless communications market, in which upstream chip 
design firms earn returns on R&D investment through licensing relation-
ships with a broad base of downstream firms that execute the production, 
assembly, and distribution functions that are necessary to embody R&D in 
consumption goods for the relevant end-user market.82 This disaggregated 
structure has several attractive economic characteristics: (i) it promotes the 
efficient specialization of labor across technology markets; (ii) it enables 
entry at discrete portions of the supply chain; and (iii) it promotes the distri-
bution of technology assets among a broad pool of producers and assem-
79. Google’s ownership of 4G/LTE-related patents appears to be a result of its acquisi-
tion of Motorola Mobility in 2011. Google sold Motorola Mobility to Lenovo in 2014. See 
WORLD IP REPORT, supra note 16, at 111 fig. 4.9.
80. These entities include the Institute of Telecommunications Science and Technology 
and China Academy of Telecommunications Technology. See id.  These appear to be Chinese 
governmental research institutes.
81. For the leading source of this view, see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 13. For a 
critical review of the large follow-on literature among scholars and policymakers, see Sidak, 
Hoax, supra note 14, at 435-45; Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1338-56
82. For extensive discussion of this point, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Proper-
ty as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 838-53 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, In-
tellectual Property] (providing  case study of “fabless” semiconductor chip industry and 
showing how patents facilitate specialization); Jonathan M. Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies in 
the Conventional Understanding of Intellectual Property, 12 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 18-20
(2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies] (providing theoretical argument that pa-
tents facilitate entry and specialization by lowering costs of informational exchange).
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blers. To the extent that upstream innovators are not engaged in the down-
stream segments of the supply chain, cannot independently deliver the entire 
package of technology inputs required to produce a smartphone or similar 
device, and face a positive rate of technological or commercial obsoles-
cence, they tend to have incentives to extract revenues by licensing their IP 
assets as broadly as possible to downstream intermediate users. Contrary to 
the standard assumption that IP rights increase the transaction costs of in-
formational exchange, secure patents enable licensing by permitting up-
stream innovator-firms to securely transmit valuable intellectual assets to 
downstream users upon agreed-upon terms of use. This structure not only 
delivers remunerative streams that support upstream R&D but enables a 
broad pool of downstream firms to compete in the production, assembly and 
distribution stages of the supply chain. Counterintuitively, patents can lower
entry costs by facilitating access to the technology inputs required by pro-
duction specialists and other downstream firms that lack comparable inter-
nal R&D capacities.
The actual performance of the smartphone market is consistent with this 
enabling view of IP rights. As Kirti Gupta and Keith Mallinson have shown 
separately, the wireless device market has consistently exhibited robust en-
try rates83, a result inconsistent with the view that high levels of patent issu-
ance act as an exorbitant “tax” that increases costs and discourages entry. 
The Figure below illustrates two trends in the smartphone market during 
2007-16, each of which is consistent with the view that high patent intensity 
is consistent with high competitive intensity: (i) market leadership has regu-
larly changed hands, and (ii) the portion of the market apparently constitut-
ed by smaller firms (defined as firms that likely have less than 5% market 
share individually in each year of the 2007-16 period84) has steadily in-
creased. Over a 10-year period, the initial leading manufacturers in the 
2G/GSM market (Ericsson, Nokia, and Motorola) have exited. Even Ap-
ple’s and Samsung’s current dominance in the 3G and 4G markets is rela-
tively recent (as of 2007, each represented less than 5% of the global mar-
ket).85 Chinese entrants, which can secure the necessary IP inputs through 
83. See Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless 
Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 893-94 (2015); Keith Mallinson, Don’t Fix What Isn’t
Broken: The Extraordinary Record of Innovation and Success in the Cellular Industry Under 
Existing Licensing Practices, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 989 (2016).
84. More specifically, the Figure refers to “unidentified” firms, which reflects the per-
centage of the market that is not accounted for by the IDC Worldwide Mobile Phone Tracker 
data reported in Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 4. Given that the IDC data covers firms 
in declining order from large to small market shares, it seems reasonable to presume that uni-
dentified suppliers are most likely firms with trivial market shares, although this cannot be 
definitively confirmed.
85. Note that Apple’s and Samsung’s share of the market increases substantially if 
measured as a percentage of revenues, rather than units shipped, reflecting the fact that Apple 
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licenses from upstream innovator-firms such as Qualcomm and MediaTek86,
are rapidly accruing market share. Huawei, Xiaomi, and Oppo each entered 
the market on or after 2010 and, as of 2017 (not shown in the graph below), 
collectively accounted for almost 25% of the global market and individually 
were the second, fourth and fifth largest manufacturers of smartphones 
worldwide (based on number of units shipped).87
targets the “higher-end” smartphone market almost entirely and Samsung targets it in part. See
id. at 5.
86. See id. at 4.
87. For source for data through 2016, see Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 4. For 
source for data through 2018, see Smartphone Market Share, IDC, 
https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/vendor (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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Figure 1: Market Shares of Global Smartphone Sales 
(2007-2016, units shipped)88
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2. Collusion Risk
Cooperative standardization exhibits a notable defect as compared to 
standardization by a government or private monopolist. As has been exten-
sively addressed, there is an inherent concern that participant-firms in a co-
operative standardization process will collusively select a standard in order 
to erect a barrier or other competitive disadvantage for non-participating 
firms.89 In the simplest case, a standardization consortium may select a 
technology that is incompatible with non-participants’ products, which will 
be effectively excluded from the market in the event the standard secures 
market adoption and, due to network effects, users then abandon non-
compatible products. Those types of claims have been alleged in a handful 
of antitrust litigations brought by firms whose technology was not selected 
by an SSO in a particular industry.90
While collusion risk is inherent to cooperative standard-setting, there 
are both internal and external forces that can mitigate this risk. On the inter-
nal side, SSOs can mitigate collusion risk through open or semi-open mem-
bership and governance policies.91 Hence, in one of the litigations described 
above, the court noted favorably that two leading SSOs “provide an open 
and public standard-setting process, in which all competitors in the market 
have equal access to the same information at the same time . . . .” and then 
noted disfavorably that the allegedly anticompetitive consortium had adopt-
ed limited membership rules that excluded certain competitors.92 On the ex-
ternal side, collusion risk can be mitigated to the extent there is competition 
between the cooperative standard-setting entity and other such entities (or 
other firms seeking to set a standard independently), in which case the 
89. For representative contributions in the economics literature (which address similar 
collusion issues in the context of patent pools), see Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy 
Toward Patent Pools, in 8 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2008); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 691, 
706 (2004). In the legal literature, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 35-8 to -9
(3rd ed. 2017).
90. See, e.g., GSI Tech. Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., No. 5:11-CV-03613-
EJD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9378 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (declining to grant summary 
judgment in favor of a SSO that comprised the relevant market’s dominant firms, which had 
allegedly used the standard-setting process to exclude the plaintiff’s technology for anti-
competitive purposes); TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 844 F.Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012) (finding that, at summary judgment stage, plaintiff had not brought sufficient evi-
dence to show that other members of SSO may have rejected plaintiff’s technology through a 
“common plan”); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that, at summary judgment stage, plaintiff had not brought sufficient evidence to 
show that other members of SSO had conspired to exclude plaintiff’s technology from the 
standard), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1216 (2009).
91. Subsequently I discuss this point in greater detail. See infra Part III.C.
92. GSI Technology Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., No. 5:11-CV-03613-EJD, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9378 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015).
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standard-setting entity is at least initially subject to some discipline by mar-
ket forces. This appears to be a typical case.93 An illustration is provided by
the standardization process for the 3G wireless communications network. 
During the late 1990s, European suppliers lobbied for two competing stand-
ards (W-CDMA and TD-CDMA) for the 3G network, ultimately agreeing 
on a common standard (known as “UMTS”) that incorporated elements of 
each, and, together with SSOs from other regions of the world, formed the 
3GPP as the SSO to govern the standard-setting process.94 Concurrently, 
Qualcomm, which held the largest single portfolio of CDMA-related pa-
tents, advocated for an alternative 3G standard known as “cdma2000”, gov-
erned by a rival U.S.-based SSO known as “3GPP2”.95 As the market moved 
toward launch of the 3G network, three competing SSOs operated concur-
rently (3GPP, 3GPP2 and IEEE) and the market ultimately converged upon 
the LTE standard managed by 3GPP.96
D. Summary and Evaluation
To summarize, we can make three observations as a presumptive mat-
ter—meaning, these are general expectations concerning the comparative 
welfare effects of paradigm standard mechanisms, which could therefore be 
rebutted in particular cases. First, as compared to government standardiza-
tion, both standardization by a single firm or by cooperative action is likely 
to outperform insofar as standard selection is undertaken by firms that oper-
ate in a competitive environment, rather than government regulators that are 
insulated from market discipline. Second, as compared to standardization by 
a single firm, cooperative standardization is likely to perform equally well 
for purposes of standard selection, so long as the standard-setting entity 
must initially engage in a standards competition with other entities. Even in 
the less typical case in which no such standards competition takes place, the 
cooperative entity remains subject to some degree of market discipline inso-
far as it must secure adoption by downstream users. Third, again as com-
pared to standardization by a single firm, cooperative standardization is 
likely to outperform in standard implementation to the extent that ownership 
of the technology inputs required to implement the standard are diffused 
across multiple firms, which is likely to result in an economically attractive 
market structure in which upstream R&D-specialist firms license technolo-
93. See Delimatsis, supra note 35, at 7 (“[C]ompetition not only among firms but also 
among standard-setting groups constitutes a typical feature of private standard-setting”).
94. See Rudi Bekkers & Joel West, The Limits to IPR Standardization Policies as Evi-
denced by Strategic Patenting in UMTS, 33 TELECOMM. POLICY 80, 82 (2009); Kirti Gupta, 
How SSOs Work: Unpacking the Mobile Industry’s 3GPP Standards, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND 
PATENTS 29, 32-33 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
95. See Bekkers & West, supra note 91, at 82; Gupta, supra note 91, at 32-33.
96. See Gupta, supra note 94, at 32-33.
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gy inputs to a broad base of downstream producers and other intermediate 
users.97








Standard Selection Less preferred More preferred More preferred
Standard Implementation Less preferred More preferred Most preferred
III. Legal Preconditions for Cooperative Standardization
The discussion above has identified a set of circumstances in which co-
operative standardization is likely to match or outperform standardization 
by governmental and private monopolist entities for purposes of both stand-
ard selection and standard implementation. In this Part, I describe the legal 
inputs that are required to support this economically attractive paradigm. 
Specifically, I identify a medley of legal inputs—robust patent protection, 
quasi-contractual licensing commitments, and surgical antitrust safe-
guards—that are necessary to execute three tasks in achieving standardiza-
tion outcomes through cooperative mechanisms: (i) to induce innovators to 
invest significant sums in “standard-relevant” R&D and then contribute the 
resulting output for purposes of standard selection in spite of the inability to 
exert sole control over the standard; (ii) following standard selection, to in-
duce intermediate users to make the investments required to adopt and im-
plement the new standard in spite of hold-up risk; and (iii) to mitigate the 
97. There is one respect in which market standardization may possibly underperform 
relative to government standardization.  If multiple firms are competing to become the stand-
ardization monopolist, then the firms may expend an aggregate sum in excess of the social 
value generated through the standards competition.  This is an application of the more general 
observation that “innovation races” with winner-take-all reward structures can yield net wel-
fare losses due to collectively excessive R&D expenditures.  However, any such social loss 
must be weighed against several offsetting social gains, including: (i) increased innovation 
incentives under a winner-take-all relative to a split-reward contest, (ii) “runner-up” innova-
tors’ R&D expenditures may yield valuable follow-on applications, and (iii) allocating a sin-
gle reward provides the winner with the exclusivity required to negotiate and contract for effi-
cient transactions with partners in the commercialization process.  For analysis of these issues, 
see Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, Rewarding Innovation Efficiently: The Case for 
Exclusive Rights, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
REGULATING INNOVATION 287 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011); Vin-
cenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, On the Winner-Take-All Principle in Innovation Races, 
8 J. EURO. ECON. ASSOC. 1133 (2008).
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collusion risk that is inherent to cooperative standard-setting interactions 
among actual and potential competitors.
A. The R&D Funding Problem
So far, I have considered various alternatives by which two steps in the 
standardization process can be achieved: (i) establishment of a technology 
standard that supports product interoperability; and (ii) adoption of that 
standard by intermediate and end-users in the relevant product market. This 
discussion has abstracted away from two predicate steps that must be com-
pleted (and have been overlooked in much recent discussion of SSOs): (i) 
firms and other entities that specialize in innovation must be induced to 
make the necessary investments in R&D to advance development of a new 
standard; and (ii) those firms must be induced to disclose and contribute the 
output of those R&D investments toward development of a common stand-
ard over which no individual firm will exert control. The following graphic 
depicts the full standardization timeline:
Figure 2: Standardization Timeline
It is important to keep in mind 
In 2017, the three leading innovator-firms in the smartphone supply 
chain made the following R&D investments: Qualcomm expended $5.74 
billion in R&D costs, representing 21.7% of its revenues, Nokia expended 
$4.8 billion in R&D costs, representing 18.4% of revenues, and Ericsson 
expended $4.39 billion in R&D costs, representing 14.2% of revenues.98
Broadly speaking, there are three possible mechanisms by which to fund the 
large investments that are required to support R&D in wireless communica-
tions and other ICT markets. First, the state can fund these activities using 
tax-supported financing. This mechanism is not widely observed in contem-
porary U.S. ICT markets,99 although it was an important component of the 
98. Data derived from WORLD IP REPORT, supra note 18, at 97 tbl. 4.3. Euro values in 
original source converted into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates.
99. This statement does not apply to the European market, where the European Com-
mission provided extensive funding for early development of the GSM and UMTS telecom-
(1) Make standard-relevant 
R&D investments
(2) Disclose and contribute R&D output 
toward standard development
(3) Specify and agree upon 
technology standard
(4) Adopt and imple-
ment standard in con-
sumption goods
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postwar U.S. innovation economy, in which government funding extensive-
ly supported defense-related computing and communications research by 
the country’s largest technology firms.100 Second, consortia or other groups 
of firms or other entities can collectively fund and undertake R&D efforts. 
This model is not common in contemporary wireless communications and 
other ICT markets, although it has been used more widely in Japan.101 Third, 
firms can independently fund and undertake R&D. This is the most com-
monly observed structure for funding and performing R&D in contemporary 
wireless technology and other ICT markets, and the remainder of this dis-
cussion will focus on this funding mechanism.
Empirical studies generally support the view that the necessity for IP 
protection to support R&D activity varies across industries and, within in-
dustries, across firm types.102 Landmark survey studies, conducted by the 
“Levin et al.” and “Cohen et al.” research teams respectively in the late 
1980s and late 1990s, which targeted R&D managers at large firms in a va-
riety of industries, found that the value placed on patent protection was 
strongest among pharmaceutical and chemical firms103, while the Berkeley 
Patent Survey, which surveyed start-ups and smaller firms in the mid-2000s, 
found that the demand for IP was strongest among biotechnology, medical 
device, and IT hardware firms.104 A complementary body of scholarship has 
identified compelling theoretical reasons, informed by empirical evidence, 
that IT firms that adopt R&D-intensive models rely especially heavily on 
patents in order to support licensing models that enable those firms to earn 
munications standards, corresponding to what are also known as 2G and 3G networks. See
Bekkers & West, supra note 91, at 81.
100. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Great Patent Grab (Working Paper, 2019) (on file 
with the Michigan Technology Law Review).
101. On Japanese research consortia in computing and electronics markets, see Bresna-
han & Malerba, supra note 60, at 104-06. Additionally, South Korea and Taiwan have funded 
public research institutes that have played a role in technology transfer in the consumer elec-
tronics industries. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Patent Tigers: The New Geography of Global In-
novation, 2 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 429, 465-66, 476-477 (2017).
102. For discussion, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence 
on the Incentive Thesis, in HANDBOOK IN LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178, 180 (Robert 
E. Litan ed. 2011) (stating that “the incentive effects of patent protection vary considerably 
(and, at some reasonable level of approximation, systematically) across industries and across 
firm types”).
103. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patents (Or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns 
from Industrial R&D, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783. For extensive dis-
cussion of the relevant empirical literature, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of 
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257-69 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Private 
Protection].
104. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent Sys-
tem: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, 1261-63, 
1278-83 (2009).
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returns on R&D investment without incurring the costs and acquiring the 
expertise required to vertically integrate forward into downstream produc-
tion and distribution functions.105
This existing body of empirical and theoretical scholarship suggests 
that, in general, the demand for IP protection in the IT market will tend to 
vary substantially across the following firm types or organizational struc-
tures:
Type I: A vertically integrated firm that can independently execute all 
functions of the supply chain. Demand for IP is relatively weak because the 
firm operates a “stand-alone” supply chain and therefore does not require IP 
rights to mediate informational exchanges with third-party suppliers. So 
long as competitors bear sufficiently high reverse-engineering costs or the 
market exhibits a sufficiently rapid rate of product obsolescence, this firm 
may be able to earn a substantial return on its R&D investment in a weak-IP 
environment. A likely example of this type of firm is Intel, which maintains 
a vertically integrated structure for chip innovation and design, production, 
and distribution.
Type II: A firm that employs an “IP giveaway” strategy in which an in-
formational asset is distributed at no charge to promote sales in an excluda-
ble complementary goods market in which the firm has a competitive ad-
vantage. Demand for IP will then be weak or even “negative”. An example 
of this type of firm is Google, which distributes content at no charge to us-
ers in order to extract data it can deliver to paying advertisers. As reflected 
by its litigation and lobbying strategies, Google consistently prefers weaker 
to zero forms of IP protection over content assets.106
Type III: A firm that (i) specializes in R&D and lacks production and 
other commercialization functions, (ii) has no competitive advantage in an 
excludable complementary goods market, and (iii) earns a return on its 
R&D investments through licensing relationships with intermediate users. 
Demand for IP will be strong. An example of this type of firm is Qual-
comm, which specializes in chip design, largely relies on outside “found-
ries” for production functions, and earns the bulk of its profits by licensing 
its patent-protected technologies to device manufacturers.107
105. For extensive discussion of these points, see Barnett, Intellectual Property, supra 
note 79, at 811-29; Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies, supra note 79, at 18-20.
106. See Barnett, Costs of Free, supra note 42, at 1104-06.
107. In 2016, Qualcomm earned 33% of its revenues, but 75% of its earnings before tax-
es from semiconductor licensing (which operated through its “QTL” entity, as distinguished 
from the sale of physical chipsets through its “QCT” entity). Author’s calculations based on 
revenue and earnings before taxes disclosed in Qualcomm Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 46. (Nov. 7, 2016). The disparity between revenues and profits (as measured by earnings 
before taxes) reflects the low marginal costs incurred by Qualcomm in each licensing transac-
tion, as compared with chipset sales.
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The firms that are widely viewed as having made the most fundamental 
contributions to the development of the 3G and 4G wireless communica-
tions standards (and are continuing to make substantial contributions to the 
emergent 5G standard108), such as Ericsson, Nokia and Qualcomm, mostly 
fall into the Type III category. Qualcomm conforms closely to this idealized 
model since it has largely withdrawn from the production segment of the 
supply chain, while Nokia and Ericsson conform approximately since they 
retain some production and distribution functions.109 Without adequate pa-
tent security, it is unlikely that these R&D-specialist firms would be pre-
pared either (i) as a first step, to disclose their technology assets to horizon-
tal competitors that participate in the SSO110 process or (ii) as a second step, 
to engage in vertical licensing relationships with the downstream manufac-
turers and assemblers on which they rely in order to reach the end-user mar-
ket. Consistent with the proposed relationship between R&D incentives, 
disclosure incentives and patent protection, the Table below shows that 
firms that have made the ten largest number of technical submissions to 
SSOs in connection with the 5G network generally exhibit high levels of 
R&D intensity (R&D as a percentage of sales) and have some of the largest 
patent portfolios relating to these standards. While not dispositive, this is 
consistent with theoretical expectations that secure patent protections sup-
port firms’ incentives to engage in standard-relevant R&D and then disclose 
at least some of the resulting R&D output for purposes of the standard-
setting process.
108. See supra Table 2.
109. For discussion of these firms’ production and distribution functions, see Annual 
Report, ERICSSON (2017) 
https://www.ericsson.com/assets/local/investors/documents/2017/ericsson-annual-report-
2017-en.pdf; Nokia Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 23, 2017); Qualcomm Inc., An-
nual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 27, 2018).
110. On the risks associated with disclosure during the standardization process, see 
BLIND, supra note 24, at 99-100; Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives 
for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1381, 1394 (2017).
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Table 4: Technical Contributions, Patenting and R&D Activity 
of Firms Most Substantially Involved in 5G Standardization111










Huawei 11.93% 7.92% 14.9% 
Nokia 10.31% 3.48% 18.2% 
Ericsson 8.16% 6.74% 18.8% 
ZTE 5.84% 4.1% 11.9% 
Qualcomm 5.06% 8.6% 23.8% 
Intel 3.62% 3.04% 20.9% 
Samsung 3.47% 5.77% 5.7% 
LG 3.07% 7.38% 5.4% 
China Mobile 3.03% n/a 5.1%112
AT&T 1.12% n/a n/a113
It might nonetheless be argued that, even absent secure patent protec-
tion, Type I and II firms would still have sufficient revenue streams to sup-
port substantial investments in R&D, which can then be monetized either 
through a vertically integrated production and distribution infrastructure 
(Type I) or by cross-subsidizing sales of an excludable complementary good 
(Type II). Certainly, royalty-free giveaway structures have been used for 
some standard-setting initiatives (for example, the Bluetooth and USB 
standards114 as well as the Android operating system in the wireless device 
market115), typically involving firms that seek to earn returns through the 
111. For technical contributions, see Tim Pohlmann, Who will be the technology leader 
for 5G? Part one, IAM, July 11, 2018 [hereinafter Pohlmann, Part one]. For patent families, 
see Pohlmann, Part two, supra note 73. For R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percent-
age of sales) see the author’s calculations, based on information in each company’s 2017 an-
nual report. “N/a” refers to the non-availability of the relevant informational item in the 
“Pohlmann” sources. Given that those sources identify the “top 20” firms with respect to 
technical contributions or patent ownership, this implies that firms for which “n/a” is indicat-
ed (specifically, AT&T and China Mobile) were not especially active in the relevant category.
112. This may overstate the firm’s R&D expenditures because the firm’s annual report 
aggregates “operations support and research and development expenditures”.
113. AT&T does not appear to report its R&D expenditures separately.
114. These technologies do not assess a royalty but do require payment of relatively 
modest lump-sum fees. For further information, see Qualification Fees, BLUETOOTH,
https://www.bluetooth.com/develop-with-bluetooth/qualification-listing/qualification-listing-
fees (last visited Nov. 2, 2018); Getting a Vendor ID, USB, https://www.usb.org/getting-
vendor-id (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
115. While Android is distributed on a royalty-free basis, Google conditions access to 
advance releases of updated versions of Android on an agreement by the device maker or tele-
com carrier to preinstall certain Google applications and provide those applications with pref-
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sale of excludable complementary goods and services that rely on the “give-
away” technology.116 However, this argument suffers from two deficiencies. 
First, it overlooks the fact that these giveaway arrangements provide the 
best evidence that, even under a robust IP regime, IP owners may have 
compelling business reasons to waive their IP rights. Second, it rests on the 
implausible assumption that all mechanisms for funding and monetizing 
R&D are equally efficient in all markets at all points in time, in which case 
effectively mandating that firms monetize R&D through vertical integration 
or cross-subsidization strategies is innocuous or a net gain from a social 
welfare perspective. A weak-patent regime would distort the market’s selec-
tion of R&D-monetization structures by endangering the viability of Type 
III firms and, as a result, at least sometimes compelling firms to adopt less 
than maximally efficient structures for supporting and commercializing in-
novation.
This organizational distortion (which favors Type I and II structures 
over Type III structures for innovation and commercialization) is liable to 
give rise to two related social costs that, in the aggregate, degrade affected 
markets’ competitive vigor.117 First, as compared to a Type III structure, 
Type I and II structures tend to inflate the capital and expertise requirements 
for viable competitive entry given that entrants must either vertically inte-
grate forward (Type I) or enter the market at two or more points in order to 
establish a competitive position in an excludable complementary goods 
market (Type II). Second, as vertically integrated operations, Type I firms 
may have no rational incentive to license their technology to other manufac-
turers and assemblers (unlike Type III firms, which typically have every rea-
son to do so) insofar as they directly compete against those firms in the tar-
get product or services market. Contrary to standard intuitions, a weak-IP 
regime may induce R&D-monetization and standardization structures that 
pose higher entry barriers and result in reduced dissemination of technology 
inputs to intermediate users, relative to the structural mix that would emerge 
under a stronger IP regime in which firms could select from a broader range 
of organizational options.
B. The Implementation Problem
Successful execution of the standard-setting process requires that a 
broad range of firms, including in particular entities that specialize in inno-
erential display treatment. See Ben Edelman, Google, Mobile and Competition: The Current 
State of Play, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L Jan. 2017, at 1, 1.
116. See Barnett, Host’s Dilemma, supra note 41, at 1890 (noting that platform owners 
can generate revenues by giving away access to the platform, which then drives sales of ex-
cludable complementary goods); id. at 1910-13 (showing how corporate sponsors fund open-
source operating systems in order to drive demand for complementary proprietary services).
117. For further discussion of these points, see Barnett, Intellectual Property, supra note 
79, at 854-56; Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies, supra note 79, at 18-20.
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vation and entities that specialize in implementation, have rational incen-
tives to make adequate investments at their respective points of specializa-
tion on the standardization timeline. In the smartphone market, it is neces-
sary to support both (i) upstream firms’ incentives to develop chip designs 
for integration into a technology standard, and (ii) downstream firms’ incen-
tives to embed those chip designs in computing and communications devic-
es for distribution to end-users. The discussion above showed that patents 
are likely to be necessary predicates for inducing innovation by R&D-
specialist firms that mostly lack downstream commercialization capacities. 
As has been emphasized in scholarly and policy commentary, however, pa-
tents may deter implementation by manufacturers and other intermediate 
users who anticipate that IP owners will opportunistically demand “exces-
sive” royalties once those users have made irrevocable investments in 
adopting the standard.118 Without adequate assurance against this hold-up 
threat, downstream firms will decline to adopt the standardized technology. 
By anticipation, the upstream firm will decline to make the R&D invest-
ments required to develop the standard (unless it has, or can acquire at a 
feasible cost, production and distribution capacities in order to vertically in-
tegrate forward through market release). Hence, a solution to this second-
step implementation problem is necessary to resolve the first-step R&D 
funding problem.
1. Re-Understanding the Holdup Problem
The holdup problem in the context of wireless device markets is typi-
cally characterized as a problem from the perspective of downstream im-
plementer firms who, once having adopted a standard, are exposed to oppor-
tunistic behavior on the part of upstream IP owners that threaten to withhold 
technology that is critical to the standard. This characterization overlooks 
the fact that upstream innovators are also exposed to opportunism—namely, 
by downstream implementers, who have a difficult-to-replicate production 
and distribution infrastructure as well as, in some cases, a difficult-to-
replicate brand in the relevant end-user market. Recall that holdup risk aris-
es in any situation in which one party must make an irrevocable investment 
that has no or lesser value elsewhere and there is no contractual solution by 
which the investing party can fully specify and deter opportunistic action by 
the counterparty. These conditions are satisfied in the case of an upstream 
innovator, who incurs substantial R&D costs starting several years prior to 
finalization of the standard-setting process, under substantial uncertainty 
118. For commonly cited sources in the legal literature, see Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things 
to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007); Mark 
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 
(2007). For similar views expressed in reports and policy statements issued by antitrust regu-
lators, see supra note 15.
200 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:163
concerning which standard will ultimately be selected or the commercial 
applications of the selected standard, and with no feasible opportunity to 
negotiate with downstream firms for purposes of implementing a still-
emergent technology.119 Upstream firms’ R&D investments can easily prove 
to be mostly in vain: out of all contributions made by firms in the course of 
the 3G and 4G standard-setting processes, only 30% were ultimately incor-
porated into the standard.120 Data on the relatively low percentages of a 
firm’s technical contributions that have been accepted for inclusion in the 
5G standard (ranging from 29.2% to 41.5% for the 10 leading contribu-
tors)121 similarly illustrate the stiff challenges, and high risk of zero returns 
on R&D investments, faced by innovator entities. These observations have a 
key implication. While innovators may be overcompensated by holding up 
intermediate users that have incurred substantial adoption costs and do not 
easily have access to any comparable technology inputs, it is just as plausi-
ble that innovators may be undercompensated given that the bulk of their 
R&D investments takes place well before initiating licensing discussions 
with intermediate users.
2. Re-Understanding the “FRAND” Commitment
Both innovator and implementer firms in wireless communications 
markets have sought to allay holdup concerns by agreeing upon certain li-
censing principles in connection with standard implementation.122 Specifi-
cally, contributors of technology inputs toward a standard typically commit 
to disclose all “essential” patents relating to the standard and to license 
those patents on a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”)
basis.123 It is often lamented that the FRAND slogan lacks any objective 
content and is therefore liable to give rise to either hold-up behavior by IP 
owners or litigation between IP owners and implementers.124 The proposed 
119. See Kappos, supra note 10; Gupta, supra note 91, at 32-33, 42; Damien Geradin & 
Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent 
Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EURO. COMPETITION L. J. 101, 106 
(2015).
120. See Gupta, supra note 94, at 42.
121. See Pohlmann, Part one, supra note 108.
122. To be clear, this is not the only purpose of the FRAND requirement.  Subsequently 
I discuss historical evidence indicating that, at least at its inception, the FRAND requirement 
was advocated by European telecom carriers in order to mitigate the anticipated increase in 
input costs arising from the movement away from protected markets dominated by national 
monopolies to a more competitive environment in which certain technology inputs would be 
supplied by outside providers.  See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
123. See C. Bradford Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT Stand-
ards-Development Ecosystem, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 25 (Jorge L. Contreras 
ed., 2018).
124. See, e.g., Geradin & Rato, supra note 119, at 112; Timothy S. Simcoe & Allan L. 
Shampine, Economics of Patents and Standardization: Network Effects, Hold-Up, Hold-Out, 
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solution is for the parties to agree to a more fully specified FRAND com-
mitment—for example, a fully specified royalty rate or at least a royalty rate 
cap.125 Antitrust regulators in the U.S. (at least prior to the recent policy shift 
at the DOJ, as discussed below126) and Europe have endorsed these types of 
policy actions in  various communications in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2015.127
These remarkably uniform policy signals have given some SSOs sufficient 
legal comfort to impose royalty caps or close equivalents in connection with 
the FRAND commitment. In 2006, the VMEbus International Trade Asso-
ciation (“VITA”), an SSO organized in connection with the “VMEbus”
computer bus standard, adopted a policy requiring that a firm disclose its 
maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty terms prior to inclu-
sion of the firm’s technology in the standard.128 This policy was reviewed 
favorably by the DOJ as part of the “business review letter” process (a type 
of pre-clearance review129).130 In 2015, the Institute for Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (“IEEE”), a leading SSO associated with the 802.11 WiFi 
standard, adopted two critical changes to its FRAND policy: (i) SEP holders 
may not seek injunctions against potential licensees unless the licensee 
Stacking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 111 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
125. See id. at 114-116; Gil Ohana and C. Bradford Biddle, The Disclosure of Patents 
and Licensing Terms in Standards Development, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 256-58
(Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
126. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
127. For examples of U.S. antitrust regulators’ endorsement of the practice, see Renata 
B. Hesse, Ass’t Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2015); Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to VMEbus International Trade Association 
(VITA)’s Request for Business Review Letter (Oct. 30, 2006); Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics’ Engineers, 
Inc.’s Request for Business Review Letter (Apr. 30, 2007). For an example of a European an-
titrust regulator’s endorsement of the practice, see Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, Setting the standards high, Address at Harvard Club of Belgium, “De 
Warande” Brussels (Oct. 15, 2009), https://www.montesquieu-
institute.eu/9353000/1/j9vvj72dlowskug/vi9cg60e6xxu?ctx=vh84exkkodyi&tab=1 (stating 
that “competition law should not stand in the way . . . of unilateral ex ante disclosure of max-
imum royalty rates and the most restrictive licensing terms that would apply should a compa-
ny’s technology be made the standard”).
128. See Anne Layne-Farrar, Ex Ante Rate Disclosure in Tech Standards, A Decade Lat-
er, CRA INSIGHTS (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:07PM), http://www.crai.com/publication/ex-ante-rate-
disclosure-tech-standards-decade-later; Ohana & Biddle, supra note 125, at 256. For the actu-
al policy, see VITA STANDARDS ORG., VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.3.2 (2015).
129. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division issues these letters pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §50.6. For 
an explanation, see DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. BUS. REVIEW PROCEDURE (June 25, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/28-cfr-section-506-antitrust-division-business-review-
procedure.
130. See Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Antitrust Div., Re-
sponse to VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA)’s Request for Business Review 
Letter (Oct. 30, 2006).
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“fails to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of an adjudication”; 
and (ii) SEP holders may not charge more than a reasonable royalty, which 
must exclude the value attributable to inclusion of the technology in the 
standard and “should include . . . consideration of the value the technology 
contributes to the smallest saleable practicing unit.”131
These policy changes (which effectively imposed a de facto cap on the 
royalty rate that can be negotiated by SEP holders) were also reviewed fa-
vorably in a business review letter issued by the DOJ,132 and, as Gregory 
Sidak has shown, reflected prior recommendations by DOJ Antitrust offi-
cials as early as 2012 and views advanced by prominent intermediate users 
in the IT supply chain, such as Apple, Cisco, Intel, Samsung, and Mi-
crosoft.133
The commonly held view that incompletely defined FRAND commit-
ments are defective suffers from a critical oversight. Namely, it neglects the 
possibility that the very ambiguity of the FRAND commitment may consti-
tute an efficient term that arises out of negotiations between innovators and 
implementers within the framework of the SSO process, which in turn re-
flects the parties’ mutual uncertainty concerning the range of applications 
and commercial value of the relevant technology.134 In the case of ETSI, a 
leading SSO in the 4G and 5G markets, it specifically rejected on two occa-
sions (in 2003 and 2006) proposals to render the FRAND royalty commit-
ment in more precise terms.135 In 2007, ETSI published a document that 
stated: “Specific licensing terms and negotiations are commercial issues be-
tween the companies and shall not be addressed by ETSI.”136 Given that in-
novator and implementer firms that are involved in the SSO process in wire-
less device markets are typically sophisticated entities with extensive 
market experience across multiple standardization initiatives, it is appropri-
131. See Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., IEEE-SA Standard Board 
Bylaws 16-18 (2019), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [here-
inafter IEEE Bylaws].
132. See Renata B. Hesse, supra note 124.
133. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential 
Patents, GEO. L. J. ONLINE 48, 49-52 (2015) [hereinafter Sidak, Devaluation].
134. For related views, see Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 108, at 1396 (arguing that 
ETSI’s 1994 FRAND policy was “deliberately vague, leaving flexibility for parties to bilater-
ally negotiate its meaning in the context of their particular circumstances”); Tsai & Wright, 
supra note 51, at 163 (describing the FRAND commitment as an example of “intentional con-
tractual incompleteness” and a choice made by “sophisticated parties”); Geradin & Rato, su-
pra note 119, at 112 (stating that “it is the very absence of a definition mechanically translata-
ble into concrete terms that bestows on the FRAND commitment the suppleness required 
to . . . ensure the widest availability of the technology embodied in the standard”)).
135. See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 108, at 1396-97; Rogers G. Brooks & Damien 
Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT
STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 10 (2011).
136. See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135, at 10 (citing ETSI, “Guide to IPRs”
(2007)).
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ate for outside observers to at least consider why the ambiguously formulat-
ed FRAND commitment may be efficient, rather than conclusively deter-
mining that it represents a market failure that calls for government interven-
tion.
Specifically, there is reasonable ground to believe that the ambiguities 
of the FRAND commitment constitute an efficient form of commitment in 
an environment in which parties have limited information with respect to 
the potential value and applications of an enabling technology at the onset 
of standardization.137 Following the well-recognized tradeoff between the 
marginal costs and gains of increased investment in contractual precision, 
the uncertain content of the FRAND commitment may reflect parties’ fore-
casting, negotiating, and drafting costs at the onset of the standardization 
process, rather than any strategic effort to preserve a hold-up option for IP 
rights holders. As several scholars have proposed, the looseness of the 
FRAND commitment, supplemented by reputational norms in a repeat-play 
environment, may provide an efficient framework for future negotiation and 
adjustment of royalty rates in response to circumstances that cannot be fore-
seen at the point of standardization.138 Reputational forces, as expressed 
through market norms concerning royalty rates and related licensing terms, 
may be especially potent in standard-setting environments in which a rela-
tively small number of IP licensors and implementers routinely interact over 
the course of the standard-setting process.139 Consistent with this possibility, 
137. On the difficulties in bargaining at an early stage over the commercial value of an 
“enabling” technology, see David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A 
Law and Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 1489, 1521 (2017).
138. In particular, Damien Geradin suggests that the incomplete specification of the 
FRAND commitment may provide parties with valuable “suppleness” in structuring the licen-
sor-licensee relationship going forward. See Damien Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties in 
High-Technology Industries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 462, 476 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., Cambridge University 
Press 2011) [hereinafter Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties]; Damien Geradin, Standardi-
zation and Technological Innovation: Some Reflections on Ex-Ante Licensing, FRAND, and 
the Proper Means to Reward Innovators, 39 WORLD COMPETITION 511, 532 (2006). Nicolas 
Petit argues that FRAND commitments are not intended to specify a particular royalty rate but 
rather, are designed to set up a structure for good-faith negotiations over royalty and non-
royalty terms of licensor-licensee relationships. See Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law Anal-
ysis of FRAND Disputes, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION 
LAW 290, 296-300 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2016). Richard Epstein and David Kappos have 
argued that SEP-intensive markets implement the FRAND commitment largely through “in-
formal mechanisms of dispute resolution” that are likely to “work far better than any system-
atic effort to judicialize or otherwise formalize the dispute resolution process in connection 
with FRAND-encumbered patents.” See Richard A. Epstein & David J. Kappos, Legal Reme-
dies for Patent Infringement: From General Principles to FRAND Obligations for Standard 
Essential Patents, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L Autumn 2013, at 69, 71.
139. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Karen Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating 
FRAND Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law From China, the 
European Union, India, and the United States, JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. (2017) (stating that, 
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leading IP holders in the smartphone market have periodically announced 
commitments to “single-digit” (or, in one case, a 5%) aggregate royalty with 
respect to the 3G and 4G platforms140, which is within the range of aggre-
gate royalty rates that have been subsequently estimated by empirical stud-
ies.141
C. The Collusion Problem
Standardization by cooperative action is attractive from an efficiency 
perspective insofar as it avoids the informational asymmetries and rent-
seeking distortions inherent to standard selection by government fiat as well 
as the distorted pricing and output effects inherent to standard implementa-
tion by a private monopolist. However, there remains an important anti-
competitive risk that is inherent to standardization by cooperative action: 
namely, the risk that firms involved in cooperative standardization will use 
that process to collude on price, output, or some other competitive parame-
ter. There are at least three possibilities, which arise at both the time of 
standard selection and the time of standard implementation: (i) the firms 
that hold ownership interests in the technology assets required to implement 
the standard may exclude competitors from access to those inputs (or may 
set the standard in a manner that disadvantages certain competitors and ef-
fectively blocks access for those firms); (ii) participating firms may collude 
over the royalty rates for use of the technology assets included in the stand-
ard, which may effectively exclude certain firms from accessing those in-
puts; or (iii) participating firms may collude over royalty rates in order to 
indirectly collude over the price of the consumption goods in which the rel-
evant technology is embedded.142
“because standards evolve over time . . . repeated interactions among the participants provide 
strong behavioral incentives for good faith bargaining”); Knut Blind & Brian Kahin, Stand-
ards and the Global Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 7, 13-14 (Jorge L. Con-
treras ed., 2018) (noting that most firms that participate in the standard-setting process are 
repeat players and have incentives to avoid “disruptive behavior”); Epstein & Kappos, supra 
note 138, at 79 (observing that repeat-play pressures may discourage IP licensors from acting 
opportunistically).
140. See Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1359-60 tbl. 2 (noting multiple 
instances in which leading IP holders in the 3G and 4G smartphone market announced maxi-
mum cumulative royalty rates). On market announcements of anticipated royalty rates in the 
5G market, see Richard Lloyd, Nokia reveals expected licensing rate for 5G phones, IAM,
(last updated Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/nokia-reveals-expected-
licensing-rate-5g-phones (reporting that leading IP licensors such as Nokia, Ericsson and 
Qualcomm have announced maximum royalty rates, ranging in Qualcomm’s case up to 3.25% 
of a device’s wholesale price).
141. These studies are discussed subsequently, see infra note 155.
142. The last scenario would only raise plausible competition concerns where (i) the 
firms holding the technology inputs are vertically integrated forward into the production of 
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Antitrust law has recognized that collective standardization efforts, and 
especially collective licensing arrangements, raise concerns that these ar-
rangements may be used to promote exclusionary strategies that protect in-
cumbents from entry. At the same time, it is widely recognized that stand-
ard-setting can have pro-competitive effects insofar as doing so facilitates 
interoperability, reduces transaction costs, and yields related efficiency 
gains. This tradeoff has arisen in cases such as Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. 
v. Indian Head, Inc.143 and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. 
v. Hydrolevel Corp.144, in which members of SSOs were alleged to have 
manipulated the standard-setting process in order to exclude the plaintiff 
from the relevant market. While the Standards Development Organization 
Advancement Act of 2004145 provides for “rule of reason” treatment for all 
SSOs (which largely codified existing judicial tendencies146), antitrust prec-
edent demands that collective standard-setting and licensing arrangements 
adopt meaningful precautions to mitigate the risk of collusion and other an-
ti-competitive behavior.147 This middle-of-the-road approach follows a bal-
ancing analysis that trades off the anti-competitive risks that are inherent to 
any form of interfirm cooperation against the pro-competitive benefits that 
can arise from standardization by collective action.
In the information technology context, a leading source of guidance on 
these matters is a series of “business review letters” issued by the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division, concerning patent pooling structures in the DVD, DVD-
ROM, MPEG-2, and 3G standards markets.148 For the sake of brevity, I will 
focus on the letter issued by the DOJ in 1997 with respect to a collective li-
censing arrangement proposed by MPEG-LA, a pioneer in the organization 
and administration of patent pools. The MPEG-LA business review letter 
has provided a template for the construction and governance of patent pools 
consumption goods embodying those inputs; and (ii) all other components of those consump-
tion goods are substantially the same across all such firms.
143. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988).
144. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982).
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301, 4303 (2014).
146. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (not-
ing that most lower courts apply rule of reason standard to SSOs).
147. See id. at 500-01 (noting that SSOs are inherently prone to collusive behavior and 
should adopt “safeguards” such as basing standard-selection decisions on “objective expert
judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased 
by members with economic interests in stifling product competition”).
148. Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to 
MPEG LA, L.L.C. et al.’s Request for Business Review Letter (June 26, 1997) (MPEG-2); 
Charles A. James, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to 3G Pa-
tent Platform Partnership’s Request for Business Review Letter (Nov. 12, 2002); Joel I. Klein, 
Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Hitachi et al.’s Request for 
Business Review Letter (June 10, 1999) (DVD-ROM); Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. et al.’s Re-
quest for Business Review Letter (Dec. 16, 1998) (DVD).
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in the IT industry.149 While recognizing the collusive and other anti-
competitive risks inherent to a collective licensing arrangement, the Divi-
sion observed that the proposed arrangement (which sought to pool patents 
held by multiple entities relating to the MPEG-2 “codec” standard for digi-
tal audio and video transmission) comprised several features to mitigate that 
risk. These included: (i) the pool would be administered by a third-party en-
tity with no business interest in the downstream product markets; (ii) all IP 
rights in the pool would be available for licensing by any party willing to 
pay the royalty fee; (iii) all licensees (including licensors in their capacity as 
licensees) would pay a uniform royalty; and (iv) the pool would be restrict-
ed to patents deemed “essential” to the technology standard. Unlike the 
“closed” pooling arrangements that were more commonly observed in the 
early decades of the 20th century150, the “MPEG LA” pool structure offers 
licenses on uniform terms to the downstream population of manufacturers, 
distributors, and other entities. Critically, given that upstream licensors must 
pay royalties to the pool at the same rate as downstream licensees, there is a 
reduced risk that licensors would have incentives to “unreasonably” inflate 
royalty rates. Consistent with this expectation, the MPEG LA pool has
widely licensed its technology to device producers and other firms and, 
based on preliminary estimates, imposes no more than a small to nominal 
increase in the price of the end-user devices that are ultimately subject to the 
pool’s patent portfolio.151
IV. Undoing Cooperative Standardization
In the discussion above, I identified the attractive features of the hybrid 
structure observed in the smartphone and related ICT markets, which have 
achieved standardization through a collective mechanism that outperforms
standardization by government fiat as a matter of standard selection, match-
es standardization by a monopolist as a matter of standard selection (so long 
as the SSO initially operates in competition with other standard-setting enti-
ties), and outperforms standardization by a monopolist as a matter of stand-
ard implementation. Additionally, I identified the institutional inputs that 
sustain cooperative standardization in the smartphone and related ICT mar-
kets—specifically, reasonably secure patents, loosely defined quasi-
contractual licensing commitments, and antitrust safeguards that together 
support R&D incentives, promote implementation, and mitigate collusion 
risk. Based on these observations, we can now assess the antitrust and IP 
policies relating to the smartphone and other ICT markets that have been 
149. See Jonathan M. Barnett, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal In-
frastructure for the Digital Economy, 55 JURIMETRICS 1, 14-15, 15 n.40 (2015).
150. Id. at 16-17.
151. Id. at 43-45.
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implemented since approximately the mid-2000s by courts and antitrust 
agencies in the U.S. and other major jurisdictions. The baseline conclusion 
is straightforward: this international sequence of policy actions has placed at 
risk the institutional underpinnings behind the collective standardization 
mechanisms that have supported technological development and implemen-
tation in the smartphone and other ICT markets.
A. “Depropertizing” Standard-Essential Patents
Agencies and courts have devoted substantial attention to the potential 
risk that holders of SEPs would be able to dictate “exorbitant” pricing or 
impose other access constraints on device manufacturers in the wireless 
communications markets. The dispersion of IP ownership interests naturally 
gives rise to concerns that the total licensing and transaction costs involved 
in assembling the IP package required to deploy a standard-dependent prod-
uct will be so high (the so-called “royalty stack”) that prices for end-user 
products will move beyond the reach of most consumers as well as discour-
age entry into the market by manufacturers and other intermediate users.152
However plausible in theory, these arguments have not been supported by 
actual market performance.
Two key pieces of empirical evidence suggest that these scenarios 
should no longer be key areas of policy concern. First, empirical evidence 
shows that, adjusted for quality improvements, the prices of smartphones 
and other IT products that are dependent on SEPs have fallen both absolute-
ly and relative to products that are not dependent on SEPs.153 Second, empir-
ical studies of aggregate royalty burdens in the smartphone markets have 
found no evidence to support widely stated claims that device manufacturers
are burdened by double-digit royalty rates154; rather, the best available evi-
152. For the most well-known statement of this assertion, see Lemley & Shapiro, supra 
note 118. The same authors have made similar assertions together and separately in subse-
quent writings. See also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Rea-
sonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1149-50
(2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach]; A. Douglas Melamed & Carl 
Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L. J.
2110, 2116 (2018).
153. Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 572 (2015).
154. See Ann Armstrong, et al., The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty De-
mands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, 68-69 (May 29, 2014) (WilmerHale, 
Working Paper), https://www.wilmerhale.com/-
/media/ed1be41360634d1fa5c3ab08647e8ada.pdf (aggregating royalty estimates for leading 
patent holders and arguing that “potential royalties demands on a smartphone could equal or 
even exceed the cost of the device’s components,” but that “many of the so-called ‘headline’
rates on which these royalty figures are based may not withstand negotiation or litigation”); 
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 2027 (describing sources supporting estimated total 
royalty rates in excess of 30% for a dual-band smartphone). As I have observed elsewhere, 
these types of estimates uniformly fail to take into account that licensors and licensees engage 
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dence indicates that total royalty rates are typically in the low to mid-single 
digits.155 These findings are broadly consistent with general tendencies in 
the smartphone markets, which have exhibited remarkable rates of growth 
in output and market adoption156 and continuous entry into the device pro-
duction market.157 These well-established tendencies are inconsistent with 
widespread assertions of endemic “patent hold-up” and “royalty stacking”
that characterize the current international regulatory consensus.
Based on these theories, and without supporting empirical evidence, an-
titrust regulators in the U.S. (subject to an important recent shift in policy at 
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, as described below158) and other commercially 
significant jurisdictions (including the European Union, China and South 
Korea159) have taken a series of actions, starting in the mid-2000s, that have 
substantially limited the enforcement and licensing capacities of SEP own-
ers. As discussed below, some U.S. federal courts have issued rulings in pa-
tent and antitrust litigations that follow a similar policy trajectory and re-
flect, explicitly or implicitly, similar assumptions about the purportedly 
adverse effects of patents in standard-dependent IT markets. Remarkably, a 
theoretical conjecture with little supporting evidence has supported actions 
that have incrementally subjected the worldwide smartphone market—a
market representing billions of dollars in annual worldwide revenues—to 
what in certain respects resembles a generalized scheme of case-specific 
rate-regulation through the vehicle of actual or threatened antitrust enforce-
in negotiations resulting in offsets to reflect each side’s patent portfolios. Barnett, Has the 
Academy, supra note 12, at 1348-49.
155. Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 1 (finding that license fees paid to owners of 
SEPs relating to smartphones constitute about 5% of the retail price); Alexander Galetovic, et 
al., An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Indus-
try: Theory, Measurement and Results, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 263, 266 (2018) (finding that 
the average estimated “cumulative royalty yield” for patent owners collectively in 2016 was 
3.4% or $9.60 per device); Alexander Galetovic, et al., Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in 
the World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1527, 1527, 1532-33 (2017) (find-
ing that, as of 2016, the average total patent royalty burden on a smartphone device represent-
ed 3.4% of the average selling price); Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Pay-
ments No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WiseHarbor (2015), 
http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20cumulative%20mobile%20SEP%20ro
yalties%20for%20IP%20Finance%202015Aug19.pdf (estimating aggregate royalty burden 
paid by smartphone manufacturers to IP licensors to be approximately 5% of mobile handset 
revenues); J. Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones 
Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 701 (2016) (es-
timating aggregate royalty burden paid by smartphone manufacturers to IP licensors and 
reaching upper bound of 4-5%).
156. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
159. On actual and proposed interventions by antitrust authorities and courts in those 
jurisdictions with respect to SEP and FRAND licensing, see Ginsburg et al., supra note 16, at 
3.
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ment. These policy actions fall into two categories: (i) actions that seek to 
limit SEP owners’ ability to secure injunctive relief against alleged infring-
ers (and, in certain jurisdictions, expose SEP owners to antitrust liability for 
seeking an injunction); and (ii) actions that seek to limit the “reasonable 
royalty” that SEP owners can expect to recover in the case of a successful 
infringement litigation or assess in licensing transactions.160 I will discuss 
each of these forms of regulatory and judicial intervention.
1. The Disappearing Patent Injunction
In a 2006 decision, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC,161 the Supreme 
Court issued a decision that has substantially eroded the availability of in-
junctive relief in patent infringement litigation. Specifically, the Court upset 
the long-standing presumption that injunctive relief follows once a patent 
owner successfully defends the presumption of validity and shows that its 
patent has been infringed.162 As interpreted by the lower courts, the eBay de-
cision has effectively put in place an entity-dependent remedies regime in 
which non-practicing entities are generally ineligible for injunctive relief 
and are confined to seeking relief through monetary damages.163 In litiga-
tions involving alleged infringement of SEPs, both courts and agencies in 
the U.S. and other jurisdictions have adopted the related view that the avail-
ability of injunctive relief should vary based on the type of patent held by a 
particular entity. Specifically, courts and agencies have taken a series of ac-
tions that have largely eliminated the ability of SEP owners (whether prac-
ticing or non-practicing) to obtain injunctive relief, based on an expansive 
and rigid view of the meaning of the “FRAND” requirement as discussed 
above.164 In some jurisdictions, courts and agencies have taken the view that 
even seeking injunctive relief can give rise to antitrust liability for a SEP 
owner.
a.  Judicial Actions
In 2012, Judge Richard Posner (acting as a district court judge by des-
ignation) issued a widely publicized decision denying injunctive relief for a 
160. The “reasonable royalty” standard is the principal measure of monetary damages 
under U.S. patent law, which provides that patent damages will be an amount “adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. §284 (2012).
161. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
162. See id. at 392-94.
163. For an empirical study showing this clear pattern in remedies outcomes in patent 
infringement litigation, see Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litiga-
tion After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1952-53 (2016) (finding that 
“while the vast majority of patentees still obtain injunctive relief following eBay, PAEs rarely 
do”).
164. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
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SEP holder (Motorola) and awarding attorneys’ fees to the infringer (Ap-
ple), on the grounds that seeking an injunction was generally inconsistent 
with the FRAND commitment.165 In 2013, a district court in another patent 
infringement litigation similarly determined that a SEP holder’s pursuit of 
an injunction against an infringing party was inconsistent with its FRAND 
commitment.166 Although the Federal Circuit later rejected any unqualified 
“no injunctions for SEPs” rule, it did hold that a SEP holder could only seek 
injunctive relief if the infringer were deemed unwilling to enter into a 
FRAND-compliant license.167 The Federal Circuit stated further that, in cas-
es in which a patent owner subject to FRAND had entered into licenses with 
other parties, there is a strong suggestion that “money damages are adequate 
to fully compensate” the patentee.168 Putting these principles into practice, 
the court then upheld the denial of injunctive relief, despite at least some ev-
idence that Apple had allegedly engaged in stalling tactics that may reason-
ably have placed it in the category of an “unwilling licensee.”169 Following a 
similar line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit, in a litigation between Microsoft 
and Motorola (effectively, Google, having acquired Motorola Mobility in 
2011170) upheld both the denial of an injunction to the patent holder 
(Motorola), adopting the principle that seeking injunctive relief is incon-
sistent with a FRAND commitment, and the award of attorneys’ fees against 
the patent holder for seeking an injunction.171 In September 2018, an admin-
istrative judge at the International Trade Commission, a U.S. administrative 
entity, declined to issue a “block importation” order sought by Qualcomm 
against certain Apple iPhone and iPad devices, notwithstanding the fact that 
the infringed patents were not SEPs (and therefore not subject to a FRAND 
commitment) and the judge had determined that the Apple devices were in-
165. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901, 913-15 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modi-
fied on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
166. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F.Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
The court’s decision was influenced by the fact that it found that the patent owner had not 
made a qualifying license offer to the allegedly infringing party prior to seeking an injunction. 
See id. at 1007 (“Defendants make no meaningful argument that they offered a RAND license 
to Realtek prior to naming Realtek in the ITC action”).
167. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
168. Id. This finding is material because, under the multi-factor test for injunctive relief 
as set forth in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, a patentee must show that monetary damages 
do not provide adequate relief. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury”).
169. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332-34, 1342-43 (Rader, J., dis-
senting in part) (Fed. Cir. 2014).
170. See Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google to Buy Motorola Mobility for 
$12.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011, 7:43 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/08/15/google-to-buy-motorola-mobility/.
171. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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fringing upon those patents.172 This is only the fourth occasion in which the 
ITC has denied injunctive relief for a patent owner who has successfully de-
fended the validity of its patent and shown infringement.173
b. Antitrust Actions
During approximately the same period, U.S. antitrust regulators took 
actions that either deter SEP holders from pursuing injunctive relief against 
infringing users or facilitate efforts by SSOs to achieve the same objective. 
In a 2007 policy statement, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division expressed concern 
over patent holdup and took the view that SEP owners, by virtue of having 
committed to license their patents on FRAND terms, had forfeited the right 
to seek injunctive relief against infringers.174 In 2011, the FTC expressed a 
similar view.175 In 2012, a DOJ antitrust regulator encouraged SSOs to adopt 
policies that would address patent holdup by limiting SEP owners’ ability to 
pursue injunctions and pre-specifying SEP royalty rates.176 In 2013, the FTC 
filed a complaint against Google, alleging that Google and its newly-
acquired subsidiary, Motorola Mobility, had pursued injunctive remedies 
against allegedly infringing third parties in violation of Motorola’s FRAND 
172. Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio Frequency and Processing Compo-
nents Thereof, Notice of Comm. Determination Not to Review an Initial Determination Grant-
ing Complaint’s Unopposed Motion to Terminate the Investigation as to Certain Patent 
Claims Based Upon Withdrawal of Allegations Pertaining to Those Claims from the Com-
plaint, Inv. No. 337-TA-1065 (April 6, 2018). https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/
fed_reg_notices/337/337_1065_notice_04062018sgl.pdf [hereinafter Certain Mobile Electron-
ic Devices].
173. See Michael T. Renaud et al., ALJ Pender: Apple Infringes, but No Exclusion Order 
for Qualcomm, MINTZ INSIGHTS, Oct. 4, 2018, https://www.mintz.com/insights-
center/viewpoints/2231/2018-10-alj-pender-apple-infringes-no-exclusion-order-qualcomm.
Note that the ITC is not subject to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which limits courts’ latitude to issue injunctions in pa-
tent infringement cases.  See Spansion, Inc. et al. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Given the different statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commis-
sion in Section 337 actions and before the district courts in suits for patent infringement, this 
court holds that eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under Section 
337”).  Upon appeal in March 2019, the ITC commissioners ruled the underlying patent inva-
lid, thereby rendering moot the refusal to issue the exclusion order.  Asa Fitch & Tripp Mick-
le, Apple, Qualcomm Trade Blows in Patent Fight, WALL ST. J. (March 26, 2019, 9:44 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-violated-qualcomm-patent-u-s-trade-judge-rules-
11553624866.  For further details, see infra notes 229-17 and accompanying text.
174. See FTC/DOJ REPORT 2007, supra note 15, at 8 n.11, 35 n.42.
175. See FTC REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 235 (stating that “[a] prior FRAND com-
mitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and ongoing royalties will 
not irreparably harm the patentee”).
176. See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as 
Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 6, 9 
(Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download. For discussion of this 
speech and other similar statements during this period by DOJ antitrust regulators, see Sidak, 
Devaluation, supra note 130, at 49-50.
212 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:163
commitment.177 In 2013, a joint report issued by the DOJ and the USPTO 
expressed the view that issuing an injunction in the case of a SEP infringe-
ment litigation “may be inconsistent with the public interest.”178
In 2013, the FTC conditioned approval of Google’s acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility (a new entity formed in connection with the split of 
Motorola into two entities in 2011179) upon Google’s agreement not to seek 
injunctions in connection with SEPs to be acquired in the acquisition (unless 
a potential licensee refuses a “FRAND-compliant” licensing offer).180 In 
2015, as noted previously, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division granted a favorable 
business review letter to IEEE, a leading SSO that had proposed to preclude 
contributing patent owners from seeking injunctive relief, except in limited 
circumstances.181 Given these developments, it seems fair to say that a SEP 
owner has little expectation that it can secure injunctive relief in U.S. courts. 
Outside the U.S., European, Chinese and Korean competition agencies have 
moved one step further in this policy direction and taken actions or issued 
statements suggesting that even seeking injunctive relief against an infringer 
could expose a SEP owner to antitrust liability.182
2. Reasonable Royalties: Regulatory v. Market Wisdom
Any economically plausible defense of a no-injunction policy toward 
SEPs necessarily relies on the assumption that SEP owners will be ade-
quately compensated through monetary damages awarded by a court in in-
fringement litigation, taking into account the costs and risks borne by an in-
novator-firm in developing technology for possible inclusion in a standard. 
There are two factors that challenge this assumption in the current legal en-
vironment. First, even a patentee who is awarded economically commensu-
rate damages is still not “made whole” since, absent a showing of willful 
infringement or other exceptional circumstances, it cannot typically recover 
177. See J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United 
States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 389, 403 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) [hereinafter 
Sidak, Injunctive Relief].  For the original complaint, see In the Matter of Motorola Mobility 
and Google Inc., Docket No. C-4410, July 23, 2013.
178. See DOJ/USPTO REPORT 2013, supra note 15, at 6. To be clear, the report does 
recognize that injunctive relief may be appropriate if an infringing firm declines a FRAND-
compliant offer from the patent holder. See id.
179. Associated Press, Motorola to Officially Split into Two Firms Tuesday, CNBC (Jan. 
3, 2011, 6:38 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/40897532.
180. Motorola Mobility LLC, Docket No. C-4410 (July 23, 2013), at ¶¶ II.B, II.C, 
II.D, IV, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724google
motorolado.pdf.
181. Renata B. Hesse, supra note 127.
182. For discussion, see Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the 
Standard-Setting Antitrust Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 118-19 (2017).
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compensation for the legal fees incurred as part of the litigation process.183
Second, antitrust regulators have advocated that courts should determine 
reasonable royalty damages in SEP infringement litigation based on the 
“smallest salable patent-practicing unit” (“SSPPU”), as distinguished from 
the larger device of which the component is a part.184 By extension, regula-
tors have argued further that SEP owners should assess royalties in licensing 
transactions at the level of the SSPPU185, which runs counter to long-
established practices in the smartphone market of portfolio licensing at the 
device level.186 This regulatory effort to remake SEP licensing practices in 
the smartphone market—dramatically illustrated by the district court’s order 
in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation187—ultimately rests on the view that allo-
cating to the innovator any portion of the value generated by the standardi-
zation process implies a form of patent holdup that confers a windfall on the 
patent owner.188 To the extent that courts regularly implement this principle 
for purposes of determining reasonable royalty damages and SSOs widely 
adopt this principle for licensing purposes, SEP owners would have reduced 
confidence that R&D investments can be reliably monetized through the pa-
tent licensing infrastructure that has supported four successive generations 
of wireless communications technologies.
a.  Regulatory Override
Under the Patent Act, a patentee that has defended the presumption of 
validity and shown infringement is entitled to “damages adequate to com-
pensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”189 Following the 
framework set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,190
courts generally determine the reasonable royalty by simulating a hypothet-
183. For details on the extensive transaction costs associated with FRAND-related litiga-
tion, see Epstein & Kappos, supra note 135, at 80-82.  On the infrequency with which willful 
infringement is found in SEP infringement litigation, see infra note 211.
184. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying discussion.
185. For an example of a regulator expressing this view, see HESSE, supra note 176; for 
further discussion of these views, see infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
186. On the market preference for device-level licensing, see infra notes 196 and 214-17
and accompanying text.
187. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 
(Koh, J.), at 227-229 (requiring that Qualcomm renegotiate existing SEP licenses).
188. See e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 149, at 1148 (“By con-
struction, the reasonable royalty does not include the value attaching to the creation and adop-
tion of the standard itself.”). For a critique of this assumption, see Edward F. Sherry et al., 
FRAND Commitments in Theory and Practice: A Response to Lemley and Shapiro’s “A Sim-
ple Approach” (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Ctr. for the Mgmt. of Intellectual Capital, Working 
Paper No. 3, 2015).
189. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
190. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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ical negotiation between a willing licensor and licensee of the relevant pa-
tent. Although there is a rich and complex body of case law on the appropri-
ate methodologies for putting this principle into practice191, any such exer-
cise ultimately reduces to a determination of the appropriate royalty base 
and the appropriate rate to generate the damages award. While Georgia-
Pacific identifies multiple factors that may be relevant in a reasonable royal-
ty analysis, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the special importance of 
evidence concerning the royalty rates in economically comparable licensing 
transactions.192 This makes perfect sense: market prices reflect a much richer 
pool of transactions than a court could reasonably expect to discover 
through competing expert witness testimonies in a single litigation. In the 
SEP context, the Georgia-Pacific framework would imply that courts 
should pay special attention to the fact that prevailing market practice in the 
smartphone and other related IT industries has used the end-user price of the 
relevant device as the base to which the royalty rate is applied.193 Yet some 
academics, regulators and litigants have urged courts to ignore market prac-
tice in SEP infringement litigation. Based on the assumption that patent 
holdup and royalty stacking widely afflict patent-intensive IT markets, Mark 
Lemley and Carl Shapiro argued in 2007 (both separately and in co-
authored papers) that courts should avoid overcompensating SEP owners by 
determining the reasonable royalty by reference to the incremental value of 
the patented component, rather than the entire value of the product.194
In 2009, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit (but sitting as a district 
court judge by designation) held, in the context of damages proceedings in-
volving infringement of a patent relating to a component of a computing 
system, that the reasonable royalty should be calculated using the SSPPU as 
the royalty base.195 It is important to note that he made this holding in the 
context of an evidentiary ruling and specifically for the purpose of limiting 
191. For a review, see THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 119-139 (2006).
192. See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (stating that, if there is evidence of an “established” royalty rate, that evidence should 
be the principal basis for determining reasonable royalty damages, as compared with other 
evidence that may be less certain).
193. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 989, 993, 996 (2014) [hereinafter Sidak, Proper Royalty Base]
(providing examples from royalty practices of Nokia, ZTE, Nortel and IBM); Sherry et al., 
supra note 182, at 3-4 n.14 (noting that market practice favors calculating royalty based on the 
device’s wholesale selling price).
194. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Patent Reward and Contribution, in 8
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2007). In a co-authored paper, Shapiro and Mark 
Lemley argue that the royalty should be calculated based on the incremental value of the pa-
tented component, discounted by the probability that the patent would be deemed valid by a 
court – meaning, the patent owner would recover an amount that is even less than the incre-
mental value measure. See Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 149, at 1148.
195. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp. 279, 287-88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
Spring 2019] Antitrust Overreach 215
the possibility that a jury would be misled by a broader royalty base above 
the level of the SSPPU.196  As the Federal Circuit has subsequently ex-
plained, this reflects prudential concerns that a jury’s “damages horizon”
would be skewed by using a broader royalty base, even if instructed to ad-
just the royalty rate to reflect the patented component’s relative contribu-
tion.197 Despite this limited application as a precautionary step to mitigate 
jury confusion, Judge Rader’s ruling has nonetheless been interpreted by 
some commentators, regulators and courts as having set forth a substantive 
requirement that courts in SEP infringement litigation must always calculate 
the reasonable royalty, and, by logical extension, SEPs must always be li-
censed, on the basis of the SSPPU.198 In 2015, the IEEE, a leading SSO in 
the IT market, implemented this approach and amended its IPR licensing 
policy (after receiving effective pre-clearance through a DOJ Antitrust busi-
ness review letter199) to provide that determination of FRAND-compliant 
“reasonable” royalties “should include . . . the consideration of [t]he value 
that the functionality of the claimed invention . . . contributes to the value of 
the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation 
that practices the Essential Patent Claim.”200
b. Judicial Restraint
While regulators have largely succeeded in entrenching a lightly quali-
fied no-injunction principle in SEP infringement jurisprudence, they have 
had mixed success in securing judicial adoption of the SSPPU approach as a 
mandatory rule that uniformly governs reasonable royalty determinations in 
SEP infringement litigation and licensing transactions. As of 2018, David 
Kappos and Paul Michel showed that, while courts had addressed the 
SSPPU concept in over 75 district court cases, they had done so in almost 
all cases for purposes of avoiding the perceived risk of patentee overcom-
196. See id., at 283 (stating that the trial court had properly excluded testimony from an 
expert witness who had used the “CPU” module as the royalty base because doing so would 
“mislead the jury to award damages far in excess of their compensatory purpose”).
197. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67-68 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), citing Uniloc USA Inc. et al. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
198. For a description of these views, see David Kappos & Paul Michel, The Smallest 
Saleable Patent-Practicing Unit: Observations on its Origins Development and Future, 32
BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1433, 1446-47 (2018). For an example of a regulator advocating that 
SSOs should adopt the “SSPPU” as a mandatory rule for licensing standard-essential patents, 
see HESSE, supra note 173.  For an example of a court deeming the SSPPU to be a mandatory 
principle in SEP licensing transactions, see FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-
CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 (Koh, J.), at 172-73 (holding that device-level licensing is 
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the SSPPU requirement).
199. Renata B. Hesse, supra note 124.
200. IEEE Bylaws, supra note 128, at 15-16.
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pensation by a jury unfamiliar with patent licensing.201 In a recent SEP in-
fringement litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, a jury even rejected
the SSPPU approach on the grounds that it did not track market practices as 
reflected in comparable licenses.202 In short: there is considerable evidence 
that courts are continuing to hew closely to the emphasis that patent case 
law generally places on comparable licenses and other indicia of market 
practice as the primary source of evidence for purposes of determining rea-
sonable royalty damages.203
It is helpful to appreciate why courts might generally prefer relying on 
market wisdom over regulatory wisdom in infringement litigation involving 
SEPs and multi-component technology more generally. SEP licensing trans-
actions take place in a market environment that is typically populated by so-
phisticated parties on both side of the negotiating table. If that is the case, 
then the choice of royalty base should not matter. The reason is simple: any 
given royalty amount can be replicated at the component or device level 
simply by adjusting the percentage rate appropriately to reflect the size of 
the base.204 It is precisely the mathematical equivalence of device-level and 
component-level royalty-setting that explains the limited “pedagogical”
purpose for which Judge Rader initially adopted in the context of a jury trial 
the progenitor of what some commentators and policymakers have since 
transformed into the “SSPPU rule” that would apply across-the-board in all 
SEP infringement litigations and licensing transactions.  To correct any such 
substantive misinterpretation, the Federal Circuit, in 2014 and 2015, specifi-
cally rejected the proposition that damages calculations in infringement liti-
gations involving multi-component products must always use the SSPPU 
approach, clarifying that this is an “evidentiary principle” designed to avoid 
201. For a detailed account, see Kappos & Michel, supra note 198, at 1444-45. As Kap-
pos and Michel note, the court in one case did apply the SSPPU principle outside the jury con-
text to identify the royalty base for purposes of determining damages. See In re Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 3, 2013) (applying SSPPU in a bench trial 
to identify the royalty base to determine damages and not to avoid jury confusion).
202. HTC Corp et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson et al., Civil Action No. 6:18-
CV-00243-JRG (E.D. Tex., May 23, 2019).  The court stated: “Ericsson [the patentee] estab-
lished, and HTC’s [the infringer’s] own experts conceded, that there are no examples in the 
industry of licenses that have been negotiated based on the profit margin, or even the cost, of a 
baseband processor [the SSPPU proposed by HTC for damages purposes].  HTC’s license 
expert . . . was unable to identify a single industry license based on the profit margin of a 
chip”, see id., at 10.
203. See supra note 193.
204. To illustrate: a 10% royalty on a component-level royalty base of $100 is equiva-
lent to a 1% royalty on a device-level royalty base of $1000. The Federal Circuit has made the 
same observation, noting that “an appropriate apportioned royalty award could . . . be fash-
ioned by starting with the entire market value of a multi-component product—by, for instance, 
dramatically reducing the royalty rate to be applied in those cases . . . .” See Ericsson, Inc. v. 
D-Link Syss., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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jury confusion.205 This limited function of the SSPPU as a preemptive error-
mitigation tool in the litigation context in turn casts doubt on assertions that 
the SSPPU “requirement” applies more broadly to SEP licensing transac-
tions in the marketplace.206 The assumed lack of sophistication among jury 
members that drove adoption of the SSPPU approach in the litigation con-
text is implausible in the case of business parties that regularly engage in IP 
licensing transactions.
c.  Market Backlash
If sophisticated licensors and licensees have converged over the course 
of the wireless markets on device-level royalty rates as an efficient market 
norm, then it would be expected that regulatory efforts to move the market 
away from that norm would meet with resistance.  This is exactly what has 
happened.  The IEEE’s aforementioned 2015 amendment, which effectively 
mandated component-level SEP licensing, rapidly produced an observable 
adverse effect on the SSO process. Following adoption of the amendment 
by the IEEE and through 2017, most researchers have observed a significant 
to dramatic decline in the number of new technical contributions to the 
IEEE 802.11 (“WiFi”) working groups that were accompanied by positive 
letters of assurance (“LOAs”) (that is, indicating a commitment to FRAND 
licensing principles) and a dramatic increase in the number of new technical 
contributions accompanied by negative LOAs (that is, disclaiming any 
commitment to FRAND licensing principles).207 The drop-off in the sub-
205. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Syss., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 
1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding the trial court’s calculation of a reasonable royalty based 
on a royalty base consisting of end-product sales); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Syss., Inc., 773
F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that the SSPPU is an “evidentiary principle . . . as-
sisting in reliably implementing the [apportionment] rule when—in a case involving a per-unit 
royalty—the jury is asked to choose a royalty base as the starting point for calculating a rea-
sonable royalty award”).
206. This type of assertion is found in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-
CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 (Koh, J.), at 172-73 (holding that device-level licensing is 
“inconsistent with . . . Federal Circuit case law on the smallest salable patent practicing unit”).  
This statement suffers from two flaws.  First, it ignores the fact that the Federal Circuit has 
specifically rejected use of the SSPPU as a mandatory rule for determining damages in all 
cases involving multi-component technologies, see Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research 
Org. v. Cisco Syss., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The rule Cisco advances—
which would require all damages models to begin with the smallest salable patent-practicing 
unit—is untenable”).  Second, it implausibly derives the proposition that privately negotiated 
licensing transactions are subject to the SSPPU approach from Federal Circuit case law re-
quiring use of the SSPPU approach for the limited purpose of avoiding jury error in determin-
ing reasonable royalty damages.
207. See Kirti Gupta & Georgios Effraimidis, IEEE Patent Policy Revisions: An Empiri-
cal Examination of Impact (March 2018), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/events/roundtable/documents/effraimidis_gupta.pdf (providing data on 
letters of assurance filed for IEEE 802.11 standard during 2005-2017); KEITH MALLINSON, 
DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE NEW STANDARDS JEOPARDIZED BY IEEE PATENT POLICY,
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mission of positive LOAs is especially large among firms that have histori-
cally been among the leading submitters of positive LOAs to the IEEE.208
Prior to this period, only one negative LOA had ever accompanied a new 
technical submission.209
The Figure below shows this striking response of innovator-firms to 
IEEE’s attempt starting in 2015 to entrench the SSPPU rule as part of the 
mandatory content of FRAND licensing principles.
4IP COUNCIL, Sept. 7, 2017,  https://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/6015/0479/2147/
Mallinson_IEEE_LOA_report.pdf (studying letters of assurance filed for IEEE 802.11 stand-
ard for 18-month period ending June 2017); Ron Katznelson, The IEEE Controversial Policy 
on Standard Essential Patents – The Empirical Record Since Adoption, Oct. 29, 2016 (updat-
ed March 2018), https://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson/80/. Note that these researchers dis-
tinguish between new and “duplicate” or “repeat” submissions; the trends described in the text 
above relate solely to new (also known as “non-duplicate” or “unique”) submissions. This 
distinction appears to account in part for the contrary results reached by TIM POHLMANN,
EMPIRICAL STUDY ON PATENTING AND STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES AT IEEE, (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPlytics_2017_Patenting-and-
standardization-activities-at-IEEE.pdf. Pohlmann presents data showing that submission of 
positive letters of assurance to IEEE following adoption of the IEEE policy change persisted 
in 2015 and 2016 consistently with historical averages, but (unlike the researchers mentioned 
above) counts “duplicate” letters of assurance filed in connection with an amendment of a 
standard. See id. at 10-11. Mallinson argues that some firms have strategic motivations to file 
duplicate positive letters of assurance in response to merely clarifying policy amendments 
and, therefore, counting duplicates can distort the use of filing data for purposes of assessing 
the “health” of the standardization process. See Mallinson, supra note 197, at 11-12. Note 
that, even if duplicate positive letters of assurance were included, this would not alter the find-
ing that firms only started filing negative letters of assurance for the IEEE 802.11 standard 
following adoption of the IEEE policy change (except for a single such filing in 2010). See 
Gupta & Effraimidis, supra note 197, at 15.
208. See Mallinson, supra note 197, at 13-14.
209. See Gupta & Effraimidis, supra note 197, at 15.
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Figure 3: Letters of Assurance to 802.11 IEEE Standard 
(2005-2017, new submissions only)210
It is possible that the market’s resistance to the IEEE’s re-interpretation 
of the FRAND commitment represents a self-interested effort by patent 
owners to preserve a licensing arrangement by which they had earned royal-
ties in excess of the levels required to support R&D investment incentives. 
Yet, given the market’s long-standing preference for device-level royalty 
licensing, coupled with the ability of reasonably sophisticated entities to 
replicate agreed-upon divisions of value irrespective of the selected royalty 
base, it is worth considering whether this practice represents an efficient 
contracting device that has evolved through the trial-and-error process of 
market experience. If that is the case, then efforts to substitute the SSPPU 
standard for existing market practices may be a misguided undertaking that 
endangers efficient arrangements for licensing intellectual assets, and im-
plementing agreed-upon divisions of market value, among the diverse pool 
of innovators, producers, and distributors that each play important functions 
in the smartphone ecosystem.
There are at least three transaction-cost considerations that can plausi-
bly explain why licensors and licensees would collectively benefit from li-
censing at the device rather than the component level. First, the smartphone 
market may calculate the license fee payable by device makers as a percent-
age of the sale price for the simple reason that this is an observable figure 
that is not amenable to manipulation or dispute by licensees or licensors. 
Second, the retail device market, being more liquid than upstream and mid-
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stream component markets, may offer the best measure of the IP licensor’s
contribution to the total product-and-services bundle.211 Relatedly, as Alex 
Galetovic and Stephen Haber have argued, pricing a component at the de-
vice level provides the most accurate indication of economic value since it 
captures the value that consumers place on that component in interaction 
with other components of the same product package.212 Third, situating IP 
licensing at the device level imposes considerably fewer transaction costs 
than engaging in multiple licensing transactions at discrete component lev-
els in the IT supply chain.213 This would require a laborious effort to identify 
the “SSPPU” with respect to each component of a multi-component product 
package.214
In the aggregate, these considerations suggest that the growing academ-
ic and regulatory consensus in favor of mandatory component-level licens-
ing, which necessarily presumes that device-level licensing represents pa-
tentee overreaching, may have things backward. Rather than assuming 
without empirical inquiry that a well-established market practice reflects 
market failure (especially in an environment populated by well-resourced 
and sophisticated licensors and licensees), it may be more prudent for com-
mentators and policymakers to start from the rebuttable presumption that 
any such practice reflects an efficient response to the technological and eco-
nomic conditions of the smartphone and related IT markets.
B. From Patent Holdup to Patent Holdout
To the extent that antitrust agencies, courts and SSOs in commercially 
significant jurisdictions have adopted a no-injunction principle (or mildly 
qualified variants thereof), it is reasonable to assert that the worldwide 
smartphone and related SEP-intensive device markets now operate under a 
de facto regime of compulsory licensing in which SEP owners are restricted 
to securing monetary damages from infringing third parties. This reduction 
in patent strength is at risk of being compounded further by regulatory ef-
forts to embed the SSPPU principle as a substantive rule for determining
royalties in SEP infringement litigation and SSO licensing policies.  This 
would effectively override and impose a judicial ceiling on existing market-
negotiated royalty rates. The logic behind this infringer-friendly regime is 
straightforward. In the absence of injunctive relief, a SEP holder can no 
longer credibly threaten an infringer with shutdown and, as a result, cannot 
211. See Bowman Heiden & Jens Andreasson, Reevaluating Patent Damages in the 
Knowledge Economy: The Intellectual Value Chain and the Royalty Base for Standard-
Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 229, 261-62 (2016).
212. See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen H. Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Val-
ue and Distribution Should Courts Apply?, 4 (Hoover IP2, Working Paper No. 19001, 2019). 
For related discussion, see Sidak, Proper Royalty Base, supra note 187, at 993-94.
213. See Kappos & Michel, supra note 190, at 1446-47.
214. See id.
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extract “excessive” royalties or other payments from entities that have made 
irrevocable investments in the patented technology and have no cost-
feasible non-infringing alternative.
This “patent-lite” regime rests on a straightforward argument. So long 
as monetary damages as determined in court provide upstream IP holders 
with a sufficient return on their R&D investment (net of litigation and relat-
ed costs), this regime would appear to preserve R&D incentives while pro-
tecting downstream implementers against opportunistic hold-up. While 
plausible in theory, this argument has two critical failings. First, it heroically 
assumes that courts typically have adequate information to calculate the “ef-
ficient” patent royalty such that innovators are perfectly compensated for 
the costs and risks they have uniquely borne in R&D and related product-
development activities. As discussed above, at least some courts and agen-
cies have pursued damages calculation methodologies that are likely to gen-
erate sums that undercompensate innovators for the costs and risks under-
taken in connection with the relevant standard-setting process. Second, it 
does not address the fact that an injunction-free regime necessarily induces 
opportunistic “hold-out” by downstream users, especially in circumstances 
in which (i) litigation is costly, lengthy and uncertain, (ii) the downstream 
user has ample litigation resources at its disposal, (iii) the patented technol-
ogy exhibits some positive rate of commercial or technological obsoles-
cence, (iv) monetary damages tend to be undercompensatory (whether due 
to judicial methodology or collection difficulties), and (v) there is a suffi-
ciently limited possibility that a court will find willful infringement and 
award supercompensatory damages.215 Without a credible injunction threat 
215. It appears that a willfulness finding and enhanced damages (which a court has dis-
cretion to award following a willfulness finding) are an unlikely possibility in a SEP in-
fringement litigation.  See Contreras et al., supra note 181, at 293-95 (noting that only one 
district court has awarded supercompensatory damages to a SEP holder and describing the 
view that such damages are inappropriate in the case of a SEP holder because of the high per-
centage of SEPs that are likely not essential). More generally, empirical evidence indicates 
that a willfulness finding is not a typical outcome in patent infringement litigation. For all pa-
tent cases filed between September 2004 and July 2010, 1.9% reached a final decision on will-
fulness, of which 48% reached a positive finding prior to August 2007 (when the Federal Cir-
cuit adopted a more stringent standard for finding willfulness) and 37% reached a positive 
finding after that date. Among cases that resulted in a willfulness finding, the mean enhanced 
damages multiplier applied by the court was 213% during Sept 2004-August 2007 and 198% 
thereafter through July 2010.  See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and 
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 441 (evi-
dence on willful infringement) and 469-70 (evidence on enhanced damages) (2012). As is the 
case in civil litigation more generally, only a small percentage of filed patent cases are ever 
finally adjudicated, with estimates in the range of 3-5%, see id., at 436-37.  A more recent 
study finds that, out of a sample of 88 cases in which plaintiffs filed a motion for willful in-
fringement, the court found willful infringement 36% of the time prior to the Court’s decision 
in Halo Elecs, Inc. v. Pulse Elecs, Inc. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (which relaxed the standard for 
finding willful infringement) and 54% of the time thereafter, although the average damages 
multiplier decreased from 2.5x to 2.1x.  See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2018 PATENT 
222 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:163
and limited assurance that a substantial damages award (net of legal fees) 
are a likely prospect, an upstream innovator may be deterred from pursuing 
an infringement action and will rationally settle for a reduced royalty pay-
ment from the implementer firm. While this outcome would reduce imple-
menters’ technology input costs and, depending on competitive conditions, 
potentially result in static efficiency gains in the form of lower prices for 
end-users, the absence of a credible shutdown threat (compounded by re-
duced expected damages) may depress licensing fees below the dynamically 
efficient levels required to remunerate innovators for the costs and risks in-
herent to R&D activities. In response, those firms would respond by reduc-
ing the allocation of funds to R&D, vertically integrating forward into pro-
duction and distribution, or seeking to monetize R&D outside the 
cooperative standard-setting process and the associated FRAND licensing 
framework. Even assuming R&D and follow-on standardization activities 
could still be successfully achieved at a comparable scale, cost and level of 
functionality, the result may be a mix of organizational structures that is less 
efficient in the aggregate relative to the mix of structures that would prevail 
under a more secure IP regime.
To be clear, courts and regulators have paid some attention to the hold-
out risk that would necessarily arise in the case of a flat prohibition on in-
junctions for SEP holders. In the Apple v. Motorola case, Judge Posner (act-
ing as the district court judge) had qualified the denial of injunctive relief, 
stating that a SEP holder could not seek an injunction against a third party 
that had demonstrated a “willingness” to license on FRAND terms.216 In re-
viewing Posner’s decision, the Federal Circuit made a similar “willing li-
censee” precondition for the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders sub-
ject to the FRAND commitment.217 In a 2015 decision in the European 
Union, Huawei v. ZTE, the European Court of Justice held that a SEP holder 
could pursue an injunction against an alleged infringer without antitrust lia-
bility for “abuse of dominance”, so long as the patentee provides sufficient 
notice and the alleged infringer rejects, or fails to “ diligently respond” to, a 
licensing offer deemed to be FRAND-compliant.218 Similarly, in 2017, the 
United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice (Patents) held that an injunction 
may be available to a SEP holder if the infringing user “refuses to take a li-
cense on terms found by the court to be FRAND.”219 In another deviation 
from dominant tendencies, a Chinese court in December 2018 granted lim-
LITIGATION STUDY 17 (2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
2018-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
216. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901, 913-14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modi-
fied on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
217. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
218. Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Deutschland GmbH 2014 E.C.R. 477 ¶¶ 
61-67.
219. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711.
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ited preliminary injunctive relief to Qualcomm in its patent infringement lit-
igation against Apple, barring the import of certain Apple phones and other 
devices.220
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has recently taken 
even more substantial steps in this direction. In a November 2017 speech, 
the head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim, stated that pa-
tent hold-out by implementer firms represents a more substantial risk than 
holdup by innovator firms (due to the fact, as discussed earlier, that the in-
novator must incur R&D expenditures well before the standard is set and 
adopted), and rejected any no-injunction policy with respect to SEPs, specif-
ically criticizing the Federal Circuit’s qualified support for such a rule in the 
Apple v. Motorola litigation.221 On December 7, 2018, Delrahim announced 
that the DOJ would withdraw from the joint policy statement that had been 
co-released in 2003 by the DOJ and the PTO and had suggested that SEP 
owners should not be entitled to an injunction given the risk of patent 
holdup.222
Yet it is important not to overstate the practical importance of these 
qualifications to the quasi-prohibition on injunctions for SEP owners. Even 
the dramatic shift in policy indicated by DOJ Antitrust has not yet been re-
flected in decisions by the federal courts or adopted by any other competi-
tion law agency.223 Second, even under the more patentee-friendly frame-
work adopted by the European and UK courts, the SEP owner will always 
be uncertain whether a particular licensing offer to an infringer will subse-
220. See China: iPhone Import and Sale Ban Over Qualcomm Dispute, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L (Dec. 10, 2018) https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/china-iphone-
import-and-sale-ban-over-qualcomm-dispute/.
221. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the USC 
Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-
delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center. In speeches delivered in March and Septem-
ber 2018, Delrahim reiterated those views. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for IAM’s Patent Licensing Conference: Antitrust Law 
and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at University of Pennsylvania 
Law School: The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 
16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download.
222. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 19th 
Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute: “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing 
Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law (Dec. 7, 2018).
223. There are some limited qualifications to this general tendency. A recent statement 
by the European competition authority acknowledges the risk of “patent holdout” under a no-
injunction regime. See Eur. Comm., Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee 9-10 (Nov. 29, 
2017). Recent guidelines released by the Japan Patent Office acknowledge the risk of both 
patent holdup and patent holdout in connection with the enforcement of SEPs. See Japan Pat. 
Off., Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents 1 (June 5, 2018).
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quently be deemed as FRAND-compliant.224 As a general matter, it remains 
the case that upstream innovator-firms continue to operate in commercially 
significant markets under a truncated IP regime in which injunctive relief is 
largely foreclosed and the availability of monetary damages is subject to 
substantial uncertainty. As a result, an R&D-specialist firm has considerably 
reduced confidence that it can capture adequate returns on its R&D invest-
ments through negotiated licensing transactions. Any innovator that enters 
into a licensing agreement with an implementer-firm (especially, a well-
resourced firm that can fund an extended litigation) must take into account 
some positive likelihood that the counterparty will unilaterally cease making 
payments, and then either the counterparty will challenge the agreement on 
antitrust grounds or the relevant antitrust authority will do so.
In the extended sequence of litigations in U.S. courts involving Qual-
comm, the FTC and Apple, both possibilities have been realized.  On Janu-
ary 17, 2017, the FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Qualcomm concern-
ing its licensing practices,225 which was followed three days later by a suit 
by Apple against Qualcomm (Apple’s primary chip supplier for the iPhone) 
on antitrust and breach of contract grounds.226  In April 2017, Apple ceased 
to reimburse its contract manufacturers for royalty payments to Qualcomm, 
which unsurprisingly led the contract manufacturers to cease making those 
payments.227 While those billions of dollars in licensing fees remained out-
standing, Qualcomm and Apple engaged in dueling patent infringement 
suits and countersuits.228 In September 2018, an administrative judge at the 
International Trade Commission rejected Qualcomm’s demand for a limited 
224. Similarly, Anne Layne-Farrar notes that, in practice, “establishing that a firm is an 
‘unwilling licensee’ is an extremely difficult hurdle for SEP holders to clear”, see Anne 
Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts on the Economic Im-
plications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1105 n. 38 (2014). Illustrating this predicament, a Korean court granted 
injunctive relief to a patent holder (Samsung) based on the finding that a defendant (Apple) 
was an “unwilling licensee”, see Contreras et al., supra note 181, at 331-33 (discussing Sam-
sung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Korea Ltd. (Seoul S. Cent. D.C. 2012)), while, in apparently related 
litigation, a Japanese court found that Apple was a “willing licensee” and declined to grant 
Samsung injunctive relief. Id. at 333-36 (discussing Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Japan LLC
(Japan IP High Court 2014)).
225. Fed. Trade Comm.’s Complaint for Equitable Relief, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., Case 
No. 5:17-cv-00220 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 17, 2017).
226. See Shara Tibken, Apple sues Qualcomm over unfair licensing terms, CNET (Jan. 
20, 2017); Redacted First Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief and Injunc-
tive Relief, Apple, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal., filed 
June 20, 2017).
227. See Aaron Pressman, Apple Stops Paying iPhone Royalties, Escalating Feud with 
Qualcomm, FORTUNE (Apr. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/28/apple-iphone-royalties-
qualcomm/.
228. See Stephen Nellis, Apple accuses Qualcomm of patent infringement in countersuit, 
REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2017 (describing patent infringement suit filed by Qualcomm against Ap-
ple in July 2017 and patent infringement counterclaim filed by Apple in November 2017).
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exclusion order that would have banned certain Apple phones and other de-
vices, even though those devices had been deemed to be infringing upon 
Qualcomm’s patents.229 On April 16, 2019, these overlapping disputes (other 
than the ITC proceeding and the FTC suit) abruptly ended when Apple and 
Qualcomm announced a global settlement of all pending patent litigation230
(which reportedly includes a payment of approximately $4.5 billion by Ap-
ple to Qualcomm231).  However, the effect of the settlement on the legal 
landscape in the wireless market was soon placed in considerable doubt. On 
May 21, 2019, a federal district court ruled in the FTC’s favor in its antitrust 
suit against Qualcomm and issued an especially broad remedy requiring 
Qualcomm to renegotiate its existing SEP licenses (subject to judicial or ar-
bitral resolution) and offer new SEP licenses to any interested chipmak-
ers.232 As of this writing, Qualcomm has announced that it plans to appeal 
the decision to the Ninth Circuit.233
The deteriorating legal environment for patent owners in the wireless 
industry is nicely illustrated by Apple’s decision to withhold several billions 
of dollars in licensing payments during its more than two years of litigation 
against Qualcomm.  This “don’t pay, litigate and maybe pay less (or noth-
ing) later” strategy is perfectly rational from the perspective of a well-
resourced licensee that operates in a legal environment in which even firms 
with strong patent portfolios cannot make a credible threat to secure injunc-
tive relief against an infringing party.  As of October 2018, Qualcomm 
claimed that Apple owed it approximately $7 billion in unpaid license 
fees.234 Absent long-term reputation effects, it would be economically irra-
tional for Apple to make that outstanding payment (or even some lesser 
agreed-upon amount) without first attempting to potentially reduce the li-
censing fees to zero through patent and antitrust litigation. Given a suffi-
ciently limited risk of a willfulness finding235 (which could trigger super-
229. See supra notes 173-173 and accompanying text.  In March 2019, the ITC commis-
sioners rendered the judge’s decision moot by finding Qualcomm’s underlying patent invalid. 
Concurrently, in another ITC proceeding, an administrative judge issued a limited exclusion 
order concerning certain Apple iPhone models found to infringe another Qualcomm patent.  
The exclusion order is still subject to review by the ITC commissioners.  See Elise Reuter, 
ITC Rejects Qualcomm Patent in Final Decision, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Mar. 26, 2019.
230. See Tripp Micklie and Asa Fitch, Apple, Qualcomm Agree to Drop All Patent Liti-
gation, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 2019.
231. See Asa Fitch, Qualcomm to Get at Least $4.5 Billion in Apple Settlement, Wall St. 
J., May 1, 2019.
232. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 
(Koh, J.), at 227-32.
233. See Nellis, supra note 5.
234. See Jean Baptiste Su, Qualcomm Claims $7 Billion from Apple for Unpaid Royalty 
Fees, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2018, 2:26 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/10/28/qualcomm-claims-7-billion-from-
apple-for-unpaid-royalty-fees/#60b7c39a6cb7.
235. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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compensatory damages) and continuing to assume little prospect of being 
subject to economically meaningful injunctive relief236, the infringer’s
worst-case scenario would result in payment of a sum equal to (i) a hypo-
thetical royalty on past sales (plus interest), plus (ii) a continuing royalty on 
future sales, plus (iii) legal fees. Aside from legal fees (effectively an option 
paid to reveal information concerning the validity of the licensor’s patent), 
this puts the infringing party in approximately the same position it would 
have been in if it had not contested the license and underlying patents. In 
practice, this so-called “efficient infringement” strategy is likely to result in 
a renegotiated royalty rate being agreed upon in a settlement between the 
licensor and licensee in advance of trial, discounted to reflect the likelihood 
of an invalidity or non-infringement ruling.  While this downward adjust-
ment in patent royalty rates merely constitutes a wealth transfer among dif-
ferent parties on the supply chain (a matter of indifference from an efficien-
cy perspective) and may even benefit consumers in the short term to the 
extent that implementers reflect lower input costs in the form of lower pric-
es237, it raises the concern that licensing fees are being pushed below dynam-
ically efficient levels, which could reduce the R&D incentives of upstream 
innovator-firms or compel those firms to adopt less efficient R&D-
monetization structures.
V. The Political Economy of SEPs, FRAND and 
Standardization Policy
Scholarly debates over antitrust and IP policy concerning standardiza-
tion processes in ICT markets implicitly assume a benevolent and publicly-
interested regulator who seeks to maximize the net welfare gains generated 
by innovation activity. Real-world policymakers, however, are exposed to 
the efforts of privately interested firms that rationally seek to influence IP 
and antitrust policy for individual profit-maximization purposes. The other-
wise rich literature on SEPs and the FRAND standard has paid relatively 
little attention to the political economic considerations that play a substan-
tial part in real-world lobbying and policymaking on these issues. In this 
Part, I undertake the beginnings of such an analysis. Based on evidence re-
236. The strength of this assumption may merit being revisited to a limited extent, in 
light of two developments that are pending as of this writing: (i) a Chinese court’s decision in 
December 2018 to grant preliminary injunctive relief to Qualcomm with respect to certain 
Apple phones and other devices found to infringe upon Qualcomm’s patents, a decision that is 
now being appealed to a higher court, and (ii) a decision in March 2019 by an administrative
judge of the International Trade Commission to issue a limited import exclusion order against 
certain Apple devices found to infringe upon a Qualcomm patent, a decision that is subject to 
review by the ITC commissioners. See supra note 210-220; supra note 173 and accompanying 
text.
237. This is not a necessary outcome. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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lating to the historical origins of the FRAND requirement and recent SEP-
related enforcement actions by certain competition agencies, I argue that 
downstream firms and economies that specialize in the production and as-
sembly of ICT devices have consistently (and with substantial success) 
sought to adjust the “IP balance of trade” by advocating for, and sometimes 
successfully imposing, limitations on patentees’ ability to seek injunctive 
relief and enforce market-negotiated royalty agreements. This incremental 
devaluation of IP rights, and the associated IP licensing infrastructure, effec-
tively shifts revenue streams away from firms and economies that specialize 
in generating technology inputs and toward firms and economies that spe-
cialize in integrating technology inputs into consumption goods. These anti-
trust enforcement actions are inconsistent with the fundamental objective of 
antitrust law, which seeks to preserve the conditions under which the price 
discovery mechanism can allocate resources efficiently, rather than influ-
encing the price mechanism to favor certain constituencies. While an en-
forcement strategy targeting SEPs operates to the private interest of licen-
sees (and economies that are principally populated by licensees), there is 
considerable doubt whether it is consistent with a broader public interest in 
preserving the vertically disaggregated structure, and cooperative standardi-
zation mechanisms, that have supported innovation and commercialization 
in wireless communication markets.
A.  The Origins of the FRAND Requirement
The FRAND requirement is typically presented as an instrument for 
shielding licensees, and as a result consumers, from the pricing power of pa-
tent holders after a technology standard has been widely adopted. This ob-
jective aligns with the private interests of implementer firms in reducing 
their input costs and, to the extent that implementers pass on any resulting 
cost-savings, is compatible with at least the short-term interest of consum-
ers. Without excluding the latter possibility (although, contrary to theoreti-
cal assumptions, recent empirical findings discussed above238 suggest that 
patentees exert limited pricing power in smartphone markets), the historical 
origins of the FRAND requirement in wireless communications markets 
cast doubt on the purpose conventionally attributed to this requirement and 
related policy actions commonly characterized as measures to protect 
against opportunism by patent owners. Rather, those origins suggest that the 
FRAND requirement was at least initially deployed as part of a protectionist 
strategy to reduce the input costs, and perpetuate the dominant position, of 
national European telecommunications carriers.
Some background is helpful. Historically, European telecommunica-
tions markets had been dominated by legally recognized or government-
238. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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controlled national telecommunications monopolies (akin to the role of 
AT&T, which enjoyed a legally recognized monopoly in national telephone 
service in the U.S. market until its break-up in 1982), which in turn main-
tained standing relationships with local “national champion” equipment 
suppliers.239 It had been common practice for telecom standard-setting bod-
ies to provide that patent holders would license to all interested parties on 
“reasonable” terms, which were left unspecified on the understanding that 
the precise meaning would be established through case-by-case negotia-
tion.240 In general, patent-related issues do not appear to have been a key 
concern, as illustrated by the fact that neither the telephone carriers nor 
equipment suppliers in the European telecom markets were especially active 
in obtaining, licensing, or litigating patents.241 This is most likely attributa-
ble to the fact that both the national carriers and equipment suppliers operat-
ed in sheltered markets, and, therefore, did not require IP rights to protect 
against competitive entry.
In 1987, the European Union created the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (“ETSI”) in order to form a standard-setting entity 
for wireless communications that reflected a range of constituencies, rather 
than only the national telephone carriers.242 Reflecting this view, one author 
writes that “ETSI removed European telecommunication standardization 
from the domain of confidential agreements struck between monopoly net-
work operators and their preferred suppliers.”243 Nonetheless, the monopoly 
carriers did not easily yield to the new paradigm, taking steps to perpetuate 
the existing weak-IP and entry-protected environment.244 In 1992-93, ETSI 
adopted, on an interim basis, a “licensing by default” standard245 that includ-
ed three key components largely favorable to licensees. These included: (i) 
239. See RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMTS,
TETRA AND ERMES 223 (2001); Eric J. Iversen, Standardization and Intellectual Property 
Rights: ETSI’s Controversial Search for New IPR-Procedures, in THE STANDARDS EDGE 298 
(Sherrie Bolin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Iversen, ETSI]; Eric J. Iversen, Standardization and In-
tellectual Property Rights: Conflicts Between Innovation and Diffusion in New Telecommuni-
cation Systems, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 80, 83 (Meehdi Khosrowpour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Iversen, 
Standardization].
240. See Rudi Bekkers & Isabelle Liotard, European Standards for Mobile Communica-
tions: The Tense Relationship Between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights, 3 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 110, 119-20 (1999).
241. See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 227, at 94-95.
242. See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 228, at 112; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 227, at 
299.
243. See Richard W. Hawkins, Standards-Making as Technological Diplomacy: As-
sessing Objectives and Methodologies in Standards Institutions, in STANDARDS, INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITIVENESS: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN NATURAL AND 
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENTS 147, 154 (Richard W. Hawkins, et al. eds., 1995).
244. See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 132, at 17-18.
245. See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 228, at 120-21; Brooks & Geradin, supra note 
132, at 17-18; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 227, at 302-04.
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IP holders would agree to license all patents deemed essential to the stand-
ard on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, subject to a maximum roy-
alty rate; (ii) an IP holder could not refuse a license to a SEP unless it had 
given timely notice to ETSI during the standard development process; and 
(iii) IP holders could not seek injunctive relief when enforcing an “essen-
tial” patent.246 This policy was dissatisfactory to IP owners—especially 
Motorola, which held the largest portfolio of patents relating to the GSM 
standard247 and had previously resisted a collective agreement by European 
carriers to require royalty-free licensing.248 In 1993, the Computer and Busi-
ness Equipment Manufacturers Association, a U.S. trade association, filed a 
complaint with the European competition agency alleging that elements of 
the modified policy were anticompetitive.249 In 1994, ETSI abandoned its 
policy in favor of an approach that only required IP holders to commit to 
FRAND licensing and to disclose all essential IP rights during the standard-
ization process250—essentially, the customary principles that govern stand-
ard-setting in wireless telecommunications to this day.
At its inception, the FRAND requirement emerged out of an intensive 
effort to preserve a “pre-wireless” status quo in which dominant national 
carriers and local equipment champions were largely protected from entry, 
and, as a result, firms generally invested few resources in obtaining, litigat-
ing, or licensing patents. These historical origins stand in contrast to the typ-
ical characterization of the FRAND requirement as an instrument by which 
to protect intermediate users against opportunistic conduct by upstream pa-
tent holders. At least at its origins, the FRAND requirement effectively op-
erated as an instrument by which a downstream buyer monopsony consist-
ing of national monopoly carriers sought to reduce the royalties owing to 
upstream innovators (in particular, Motorola) that were not part of the group 
of national carriers and equipment suppliers that had dominated European 
national telecom markets. Approximately the same strategy is consistent 
with subsequent lobbying activity leading to European antitrust enforcement 
246. Bekkers and Liotard, supra note 240, at 121; Bekkers et al., supra note 29, at 181; 
Sidak, Injunctive Relief, supra note 182, at 391; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 302-04.
247. See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 241, at 94.
248. See GARRY A. GARRARD, CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS: WORLDWIDE MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT 140 (1998); Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in 
the United States and Europe, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 164-65 (Jorge L. Contre-
ras ed., 2018). On the agreement among European carriers, see Iversen, Standardization, su-
pra note 241, at 93.
249. See Bekkers et al., supra note 29, at 181; Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135, at 9; 
Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 303-05.
250. See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 240, at 122; Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135,
at 9; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 307-08. For these elements in the current policy, see 
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE, ETSI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS POLICY 37 (VERSION 37).
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actions against Qualcomm, the leading technology contributor to the 3G 
wireless standard, which relied on its patent portfolio to challenge U.S. and 
European telecom carriers that had adopted what was later shown to be the 
technically inferior TDMA/GSM standard.251 In 2007, the European Com-
mission initiated an antitrust enforcement action against Qualcomm, follow-
ing a formal complaint filed in 2005 with the Commission by Broadcom, 
Ericsson, NEC, Nokia, Panasonic, and Texas Instruments.  Those firms, all 
of which were licensees of Qualcomm’s CDMA chip technology252, claimed 
that Qualcomm’s licensing practices were inconsistent with its FRAND 
commitment and would impede the rollout of the 3G wireless network.253
After four years, the Commission closed the investigation into Qual-
comm254, following a settlement agreement between Qualcomm and 
Nokia.255 Contrary to the dire predictions of the carriers and device manu-
facturers, the 3G wireless network was nonetheless widely adopted across a 
broad range of consumer income segments256, suggesting that royalty rates 
did not reach the “exorbitant” levels that had been predicted. As discussed 
previously, empirical evidence confirms this implication, showing that roy-
alty rates in the 3G and 4G smartphone markets have generally constituted 
no more than single-digit percentages of the device’s sale price.257
B. SEPs, Antitrust Policy and the IP Balance of Trade
Policy positions expressed by firms with respect to the treatment of 
SEPs and the FRAND commitment under antitrust and patent law align 
closely with firms’ position on the industry supply chain. As I have shown 
elsewhere,258 the policy preferences expressed in amicus briefs filed in SEP-
related litigation demonstrate a consistent pattern: net technology users that 
specialize in production, distribution and other implementation activities 
tend to favor weaker enforcement of SEPs and stricter construction of the 
FRAND commitment; approximately the opposite policy positions are ex-
pressed by net technology producers that specialize in R&D. This same di-
vergence can be observed at the “country level” among jurisdictions that are 
populated principally by firms that specialize in the implementation func-
251. See Bekkers & West, supra note 94, at 81-82, 85, 90-91.
252. See Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties, supra note 138, at 463 n.6.
253. See BJORN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION UNDER EU COMPETITION RULES AND 
US ANTITRUST LAWS: THE RISE AND LIMITS OF SELF-REGULATION 64-65 (2014); Geradin & 
Rato, supra note 119, at 106, 122.
254. See Adam Cohen, European Commission Closes Qualcomm Investigation, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 25, 2009.
255. See LUNDQVIST, supra note 241; Don Clark, Qualcomm, Nokia Reach Deal to End 
Fight Over Patents, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008. As part of the settlement, Nokia withdrew its 
complaint with the European antitrust commission.
256. See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 241, at 95-96.
257. See supra note 155.
258. See Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1373-75.
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tions of the technology supply chain. Antitrust policies pursued in certain 
Asian jurisdictions with respect to SEPs reflect sensitivity to the input costs 
borne by local device manufacturers, which are generally net technology 
users in the global supply chain and typically assert that the licensing fees 
paid to IP holders are “excessive.”259 As noted by former FTC Chairman 
Maureen Ohlhausen antitrust enforcers in these jurisdictions appear to use 
antitrust law (specifically, the “abuse of dominance” principle that extends 
beyond “monopolization” offenses as understood in U.S. antitrust law) to 
take action against what are perceived to be “‘unfairly’ high prices” or, in 
the IP context, excessively high royalty fees.260 With respect specifically to 
SEP licensing markets, antitrust authorities in China, South Korea, and 
Taiwan have pursued actions resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in 
fines and, in some cases, settlements reducing the royalty rates under which 
Qualcomm licenses its patented technologies for use in CDMA-based 3G 
and 4G (and now 5G) devices and networks.261 The Table below summariz-
es these enforcement actions and remedies, as well as contemporaneous en-
forcement actions taken by European and U.S. antitrust regulators, concern-
ing Qualcomm’s licensing practices.
259. A statement made by an executive at Xiaomi, a leading Chinese handset maker, 
illustrates this perspective. In an interview with a journalist, the executive bemoans the licens-
ing fees that Chinese firms must pay to foreign SEP owners: “(1) I pay but others don’t pay 
(2) I pay a higher rate than others (3) the rate is too expensive to afford.” Quoted in Joff Wild, 
Licensors must understand that what is FRAND in US and EU may not be in China, says Xia-
omi IP strategy chief, IAM-MEDIA.COM, http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=
18521233-ec1e-4e90-9af0-a9b57de41504 (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
260. OHLHAUSEN, supra note 179, at 93.
261. On the Korean enforcement actions, see S. Korea fines Qualcomm $208 mln in an-
ti-trust case, REUTERS, (July 23, 2009, 4:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/qualcomm-
korea/update-2-s-korea-fines-qualcomm-208-mln-in-anti-trust-case-
idUSSEO19318620090723, and Se Young Lee & Stephen Nellis, South Korea fines Qual-
comm $854 million for violating competition laws, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2016, 10:06 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-antitrust-idUSKBN14H062?il=0; for the Chi-
nese enforcement action, see Paul Mozur and Quentin Hardy, China Hits Qualcomm with Fi-
ne, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/business/international/
qualcomm-fine-china-antitrust-investigation.html; and for the Taiwanese enforcement action, 
see Qualcomm Fined Record $773 Million in Taiwan Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 
2017, 7:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-11/qualcomm-fined-
773-million-in-taiwan-for-antitrust-violations.
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262. The year denotes the year in which the fine or other remedy was issued. In the case 
of the FTC action, which is still pending, it denotes the year in which the enforcement action 
was commenced.
263. Qualcomm Technology Licensing, QUALCOMM.COM, https://www.qualcomm.com/
invention/licensing (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
264. All figures represent the IP “balance of payments” as of the year indicated in the 
Table (or the nearest year for which data is available). The calculations are based on (except 
for Taiwan): THE WORLD BANK, DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.GSR.ROYL.CD and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD. The 
World Bank figures are in current dollars and measure all payments made, or received, for the 
use of intellectual property rights. Data for Taiwan (which may be underestimated) was 
sourced from OECD. Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD: STATS,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.
265. South Korean watchdog cuts fine on Qualcomm after decade-old legal battles, 
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2019.
266. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Cease and Desist Order Against 
Qualcomm Inc [sic] orporated (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/
yearly-2009/sep/individual-000038.html.
267. Qualcomm Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 9, 2015) (describing fine, settle-
ment and resolution of investigation with China competition authority). Qualcomm also 
agreed to the following reduction in the royalty rates charged to local device manufacturers: 
“For licenses of Qualcomm’s 3G and 4G essential Chinese patents for branded devices sold 
for use in China, Qualcomm will charge royalties of 5% for 3G devices (including multimode 
3G/4G devices) and 3.5% for 4G devices (including 3-mode LTETDD devices) that do not 
implement CDMA or WCDMA, in each case using a royalty base of 65% of the net selling 
price of the device.” See id., at Exhibit 99.1.
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In the case of China, Korea, and Taiwan, the pattern of antitrust en-
forcement, hefty fines, and modified licensing terms bears indications of a 
protectionist use of competition law to reduce the royalty burden of local 
device manufacturers, and, more generally, mitigate the jurisdiction’s nega-
tive IP balance of payments (equal to receipts less payments for IP).272 Each 
268. It appears that Qualcomm is currently appealing this penalty and decision. See
Qualcomm fends off Korea antitrust woes with Samsung backing, TELECOMREVIEW (Feb. 4, 
2018), www.telecomreview.com/index.php/articles/telecom-vendors/2032-qualcomm-fends-
off-korea-antitrust-woes-with-samsung-backing (reporting that Samsung had entered into ex-
panded cross-licensing agreement with Qualcomm and had agreed to withdraw its support for 
the Korean antitrust regulator’s suit against Qualcomm).
269. Yimou Lee & Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm Settles Anti-Trust Case with Taiwan Reg-
ulator for $93 Million, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018, 10:14 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-qualcomm-taiwan/qualcomm-settles-anti-trust-case-
with-taiwan-regulator-for-93-million-idUSKBN1KV07Z?feedType=RSS&feedName=
businessNews. As part of the settlement, Qualcomm agreed to invest $700 million in Taiwan 
over a period of several years. Additionally, it agreed to provide licenses to competing chip 
manufacturers, Intel and MediaTek (a Taiwanese corporation), in the event it sought to en-
force a patent against those firms.
270. See Nellis, supra note 5.
271. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Qualcomm 
€997 Million for Abuse of Dominant Position (Jan. 24, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-421_en.htm. Qualcomm has appealed the fine. Qualcomm Asks EU Court to 
Scrap $1.2 Billion Fine, REUTERS (June 4, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-eu-qualcomm-antitrust-court/qualcomm-asks-eu-court-to-scrap-1-2-billion-antitrust-
fine-idUSKCN1J02EO.
272. Note that I am not addressing decisions by courts in these jurisdictions that relate 
specifically to patent law, which may in some cases deviate from the IP-skeptical tendencies 
observed in policy statements and enforcement actions pursued by competition regulators in 
these countries. In particular, I note the decision in December 2018 by a Chinese court to 
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jurisdiction shown in the Table above, with the exception of Japan and the 
U.S., has a net IP deficit (that is, the amount paid by domestic to foreign 
firms for IP rights exceeded payments received by domestic firms from for-
eign firms for IP rights), and, in the case of China, Korea, and Taiwan, has 
one or more major wireless handset device manufacturers.273 For example, 
China had a net IP deficit of $20.9 billion in 2015 and has several major 
wireless device manufacturers, which rely on licensing IP from foreign 
firms, due either to incomplete patent coverage or lack of sufficient techno-
logical expertise.274 If Chinese competition law actions with respect to SEPs 
are situated within a broader government-sponsored standardization strate-
gy, there are even stronger indications of protectionist motivations. Chinese 
authorities have actively promoted the development of Chinese-specific var-
iations on international standards in a broad range of technologies, including 
DVD players, audio/visual “codec” standards, local area networking, opti-
mal media storage, cloud computing, and the internet of things.275 In particu-
lar, China invested heavily (and unsuccessfully) in developing alternative 
“indigenous” standards in wireless communications276: (i) the TD-SCDMA 
standard, which would have substituted for the dominant W-CDMA stand-
ard, and (ii) the “WAPI” standard, which would have substituted for the 
dominant WiFi standard.277 These domestic standards are typically launched 
together with IP policies that mandate or encourage royalty-free or nominal-
grant limited injunctive relief to Qualcomm with respect to certain Apple phones and other 
devices found to infringe upon Qualcomm’s patents. See supra note 220.
273. The Japanese and European firms listed in the Table above are licensees of Qual-
comm but have either withdrawn from, or do not have a substantial share in, the worldwide 
smartphone production market. See Smartphone Rankings Shaken Up Once Again as Huawei 
Surpasses Apple, INT’L DATA CORP. (July 31, 2018), https://www.idc.com/
getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44188018.
274. See DIETER ERNST, CHINA’S STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS CHALLENGE: FROM 
LATECOMER TO (ALMOST) EQUAL PLAYER 22 (Centre for International Governance Innova-
tion ed., 2017).
275. See generally Michael Murphree & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National 
Competitiveness, 40 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2, 7-8, 14, 21 (2016); 
STEPHEN J. EZELL & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE MIDDLE KINGDOM GALAPAGOS ISLAND 
SYNDROME: THE CUL-DE-SAC OF CHINESE TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS  13 ( Information 
Technology & Innovation Foundation ed., 2014); DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS:
NEW NORMS IN OLD INSTITUTIONS (2013); SCOTT KENNEDY, RICHARD P. STUTTMEIER &
JUN SU, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS AND INNOVATION:
CHINA’S EVOLVING ROLE IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, NBER SPECIAL REPORT
#15 21-25 (2008); Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining 
China’s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POLICY 41 (2006).
276. China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Pol-
icies on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4266 (May 2011) (Final), at 5-24.
277. Id. at 5-22 to 5-24. On the WAPI standard, see Ping Gao, WAPI: A Chinese Attempt 
to Establish Wireless Standards and the International Coalition that Resisted, 23 COMM. OF 
THE ASSOC. FOR INFO. SYS. 151 (2008).
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royalty licensing278, and, as formalized in recent amendments to the Stand-
ardization Law of the People’s Republic of China, require the exclusive or 
mostly exclusive use of technology owned by Chinese firms.279 The strategy 
is clear. By developing standards that are not reliant on foreign-owned IP 
and launching those standards subject to IP policies that mandate or encour-
age royalty-free or nominal-royalty licensing,280 local manufacturers’ royalty 
fees payable to foreign IP holders can be reduced,281 export margins can be 
improved,282 and foreign entrants may be compelled to adopt the Chinese 
standard, which could then promote adoption in non-Chinese markets.283
While these efforts have largely been unsuccessful (due, in several cases, to 
the lack of technological equivalence leading to underadoption by the do-
mestic market),284 often are unable to avoid using foreign IP,285 and have 
never led to international adoption,286 they illustrate the political-economic 
motivations that may at least partially drive competition law policy actions 
by Chinese regulators on SEP/FRAND issues.
C. Do Consumers Always Benefit from Reduced Input Costs?
It might be argued that competition law enforcement actions that limit 
the pricing power of IP licensors nonetheless promote consumer interests (at 
278. See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 262, at 3, 33-34.
279. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 
1974 (2018), at 181. These amendments appear to track existing policies described by other 
commentators. See Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 275, at 7-8, 14; EZELL & ATKINSON,
supra note 262, at 13.
280. See Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 262, at 7-8.
281. See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 262, at 34; see also USITC, supra note
276, at 5-22 to 5-24.
282. See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (describing how Chinese standardization policy is designed to 
reduce manufacturers’ costs of accessing IP).
283. Id. at 36; EZELL & ATKINSON, supra note 275, at 14-19. With respect to China’s
development of an alternative to the MPEG audio-video codec standard, the authors write: 
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least in the short term) by promoting reduced retail prices for end-users that 
purchase the products and services embodying the licensors’ technology. 
But there is no assurance that this will occur. If the implementer firm holds 
a dominant branded position in the retail market, and is therefore substan-
tially protected against entry, then it may have no or little incentive to pass 
on the cost-savings to consumers.287 Consistent with this possibility, in the 
second quarter of 2018, Apple enjoyed record profits despite having in-
creased prices on its newest model iPhones,288 while Apple’s principal sup-
pliers and assemblers suffered a revenue decline, reportedly due in part to 
Apple’s bargaining leverage in renegotiating the fees paid to those firms.289
The first development—an increase in Apple’s profits concurrently with an 
increase in prices—suggests that Apple enjoyed during this period some de-
gree of pricing power in the retail market, due potentially to brand power, 
inelastic demand among higher-income consumers290 (the average price of 
an Apple iPhone in 2016 was $690, as compared to $214 for an average 
Android-compatible phone),291 and consumers’ switching costs arising from
Apple’s “walled garden” ecosystem.292 The second development—a decline 
in suppliers’ revenues—suggests that Apple enjoys buying power in the up-
stream inputs market, which may account in part for the fact that Apple cap-
tures by far the largest portion (42%) of the retail price of each iPhone 7 
sold, substantially in excess of the value captured by any other firm in the 
supply chain.293 By contrast, all IP licensors collectively captured only about 
5% of the retail price.294
Apple’s bargaining power with respect to upstream input suppliers may 
be especially strong in the case of components that Apple (or other distribu-
287. For a similar view, see Geradin & Rato, supra note 119, at 106.
288. See Therese Poletti, Apple Earnings Show Why You Can Expect More $1000 
iPhones, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
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289. See Debby Wu, What’s Good for Apple Isn’t Always Best for iPhone Suppliers,
BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2018, 10:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-
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COMPANY (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40525598/apple-bet-that-wed-pay-
more-for-phones-it-was-right. More recently, it appears that Apple’s pricing on its highest-end
models may have overestimated consumers’ demand for these devices, suggesting that the 
market has identified limits to Apple’s pricing power. See Jefferson Graham, Did Apple Retail 
Prices Get Too High in 2018? Consumers Say Yes, USA TODAY (Dec. 29, 2018, 11:41 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2018/12/29/did-apple-retail-prices-get-too-
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tors that enjoy uniquely branded positions on the supply chain), given its 
ample financial and human capital, can credibly source internally or from
competing suppliers. This risk is not theoretical: in 2017, Apple terminated 
its relationship with two chip suppliers (while reportedly poaching engi-
neers from both firms), reportedly because it had developed the expertise to 
produce the chips internally.295 Given the absence of a credible injunctive 
threat as discussed above (or contractual restrictions that may limit a suppli-
er’s ability to bring an infringement suit),296 even input suppliers with fairly 
substantial patent portfolios may have little leverage by which to negotiate 
meaningful royalties from a large branded distributor. While this reduces 
the producer/distributor firm’s input costs, it is not clear that this would re-
sult in any pricing benefit for consumers in the short term and would likely 
depress the investment incentives of upstream R&D-specialist firms over a 
longer time period.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom assumes that wireless communications markets 
are widely failing at standardization and the government can improve it. In 
this paper, I have argued that those markets are widely succeeding at stand-
ardization and government intervention risks undermining it. For approxi-
mately a decade, antitrust regulators and some courts, supported by large 
intermediate users and substantial portions of the scholarly community, 
have adopted the view that patent-intensive ICT markets suffer from endem-
ic market failure, which in turn invites regulatory intervention to “protect”
against overreaching by patent licensors. Yet empirical inquiry and several 
decades of market performance suggest otherwise. In particular, the explo-
sive growth of the wireless communications markets—characterized by de-
clining (quality-adjusted) prices, expanding output, and continuous innova-
tion—has relied on an overlooked institutional infrastructure largely 
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cessing units, see Paul Sandle, Imagination Technologies’ Shares Plunge 70 Percent After 
Apple Ditches Firm, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2017, 2:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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integrated circuit), see Eric Auchard & Harro Ten Wolde, Apple May Ditch Dialog, Analyst 
Says, Hitting Chipmakers’ Shares, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017, 4:54 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dialog-apple/apple-may-ditch-dialog-analyst-says-hitting-
chipmakers-shares-idUSKBN17D0VF.
296. This was apparently the case with respect to Imagination Technologies, a supplier 
of graphics chipsets to Apple, which terminated the supply relationship when it elected to de-
sign and produce the chipsets internally. The supplier was bound by a dispute resolution 
agreement that apparently limited its’ ability to bring a patent infringement claim in court. See
Ben Lovejoy, Apple’s Supplier Battles Intensify as Imagination Technologies Files Formal 
Dispute, 9TO5MAC (May 4, 2017, 3:54 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2017/05/04/imagination-
technologies-apple-dispute-resolution-procedure/.
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assembled by market actors and reliant on the two key legal inputs of secure 
IP rights and contract enforcement. Leading contributors to the 3G and 4G 
markets have demonstrated the capacity to deliver standardization outcomes 
through cooperative arrangements that likely outperform the alternatives of 
government monopoly, which is subject to informational deficits and regu-
latory capture, and private monopoly, which triggers the risk of pricing and 
other distortions inherent to protected dominant positions. That market-
driven standardization process has relied on reasonably secure property 
rights, quasi-contractual licensing commitments supplemented by reputa-
tional discipline, and targeted application of antitrust safeguards against col-
lusion risk. The international policy trajectory in SEP markets not only 
threatens that mix but rewards implementer firms and jurisdictions that seek 
to shift the “IP balance of trade” by lobbying for policy actions that reduce 
those firms’ and jurisdictions’ input costs but endanger the viability of 
R&D-specialist entities and cooperative standardization arrangements that 
have promoted innovation and commercialization in wireless communica-
tions markets.
